In this argument, the state appears to confuse the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). The state argues that “[t]his Court's prior determination in
Hamilton v. Roberts, that Liquor Control Commission Rule 11 was not void for vagueness is
res judicata as to Appellants' identical First Amendment challenge to that rule in this case.” Appellees' Br. at 15. We “may look to the common law or to the policies supporting res judicata and collateral estoppel in assessing the preclusive effect of decisions of other federal courts.”
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). In contrast, when considering the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, we must look to the law of that state.
Id.;
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Because the judgment upon which the State relies for its preclusion argument was issued by a federal court, we look to federal law to determine its preclusive effect. This Court has described res judicata as “extinguish[ing] ‘all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.’ ”
Walker v. General Tel. Co., 25 Fed.Appx. 332, 336 (6th Cir.2001). The broad sweep of res judicata is likely inapplicable here, as one of the required elements is that the issues raised in the subsequent action were raised or should have been raised in the first lawsuit.
Id. Here, although Rule 11 was challenged in the first lawsuit, Rule 9 was not, presumably because it was only Rule 11 under which Bogarts was penalized at the time. The state has not argued or made any showing that Bogarts should also have challenged Rule 9 at the time. Because the current suit also includes additional challenges to both Rules beyond void for vagueness claims, it would be inappropriate to apply res judicata to the plaintiffs' claims in their entirety.