Thus reduced to its essence, the Plaintiffs are contending that when an immediate family member is an at-will employee in the office representing a party, the impartiality of the judge is called into question. This court, however, has rejected a similar argument in
Weinberger, where we recognized that a relative's mere at-will employment relationship with an agency or law firm representing a party before a district court judge in a particular case is insufficient to require a judge to recuse himself.
Weinberger, 557 F.2d at 463–64. There, we held that a district judge was not required to recuse himself where the judge's son was an associate in a law firm representing a party to the litigation but had no involvement in the litigation at issue.
Id. We concluded that the son's interest as an associate in the law firm was too remote to require disqualification under the “reasonable man” standard of
28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
Id. Here, as the district court noted, there is even a lesser need for recusal given the fact that, unlike the law firm context, the family member here has no direct financial interest in the outcome of the case. Accordingly, it appears Judge James did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself under
§ 455(a).