Taking a novel position in voting rights litigation, the Attorney General argues that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue after they dismissed the Secretary of State and, alternatively, the Eleventh Amendment bars this suit. Neither argument works. In order to have constitutional standing, a plaintiff must establish (1) an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) redressable by a favorable ruling.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Although the Governor has not appealed, the district court must have had jurisdiction to find liability and fashion a remedial order against the Governor. Further, standing must exist at all stages of the litigation.
Fontenot v. McCraw, 777 F.3d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 2015). The plaintiffs plainly had standing to maintain suit against Louisiana's Governor. Without raising any complaint in the past about his standing, the Governor has been a party defendant in nearly all of Louisiana's voting rights cases challenging judicial districts
, and as chief executive, he plays a pivotal role in the enactment of legislation that could address any adverse federal judgment.
Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 159 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A case brought against a state officer in his official capacity is essentially a suit against the state.... Because the state itself is a party, causation and redressability are easily satisfied in this case.... A declaration of unconstitutionality directed against the state would redress [the plaintiff's] injury....”).
In contrast, the Secretary of State, although an elected official
, is responsible for conducting elections only after the districts have been changed, whether by law or by court order. The Attorney General's implicit argument that only the Secretary of State should have been sued is wrong.