The simple answer to the Committees' argument is
Buckley's holding that the Act's disclosure requirements are not inconsistent with the First Amendment.
424 U.S. at 82–83, 96 S.Ct. at 664–65. The Supreme Court considered the important privacy and association rights at stake for donors, acknowledged that “public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute,” and held that the disclosure requirements were “the least restrictive means” of furthering the substantial government interests in informing the electorate on the sources of campaign money, deterring corruption, and detecting violations of the Act's contribution limitations.
Id. at 67–68, 96 S.Ct. at 657–58. Indeed, because the “best efforts” provision—added to the Act after the Court decided
Buckley—essentially offers an optional safe harbor or affirmative defense for political committees unable to secure the identifying information, it actually makes the Act's reporting requirements less stringent than the absolute disclosure requirements upheld in
Buckley. As the district court explained, “the ‘best efforts' regulation does not compel political committees to do anything, and there is no penalty for violation of the ‘best efforts' regulation.”
Republican Nat'l Comm., No. 94–1017, slip op. at 11. Because the absolute disclosure requirement at issue in
Buckley does not violate the First Amendment, neither can an optional safe harbor for those unable to comply with the absolute disclosure requirement.