Albert argues that a reasonable officer should not be expected to know of
Indrisano 's gloss on the intent requirement of
§ 53a–182(a) in making a probable cause determination. In support, he cites
Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, a case in which this court recognized the general rule that we “impute knowledge of the case law to public officials,”
id. at 535, but found a limited exception in the “unusual case” in order to advance the broader goals of qualified immunity,
id. at 534–35. We deemed
Amore an unusual case because the arresting officer there actually reviewed penal law text at the time he placed defendant under arrest, unaware that the section he consulted had been declared unconstitutional some 15 years earlier.
See id. at 526–27. Here Sergeant Albert did not review the text of
§ 53a–182(a) before placing Zalaski and Oatis under arrest; indeed, he did not even arrest them for disorderly conduct. These circumstances locate this case a considerable distance from
Amore. In any event, we do not here decide what constitutes an “unusual case” falling within
Amore 's exception because we conclude that a reasonable officer in the circumstances presented by this case, even when charged with knowledge of
Indrisano, would have had arguable probable cause to believe Zalaski and Oatis were violating
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a–182(a). Thus, our ensuing analysis does not—and need not—afford Albert the benefit of any
Amore exception.