California argues that this case does not come within this exception because Schaefer has demonstrated no likelihood of running for office in that state in the future. Schaefer refuses to disclose his intentions, but argues that his political aspirations are irrelevant in evaluating the mootness exception. California cites
Thorsted v. Munro, 75 F.3d 454 (9th Cir.1996), for the proposition that we should examine Schaefer's intentions regarding future candidacy. In
Thorsted, we observed that the candidate's claim was not rendered moot because the allegations in his complaint indicated “his intent to seek reelection in the future.”
Id. at 456 (parenthesis omitted). The court never stated, however, that
only when a candidate plans to seek reelection is the case not moot. The capable-of-repetition prong should not be construed as narrowly as California suggests.
See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 333 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 995. In
Dunn, plaintiff Blumstein had been denied the right to vote because he had not resided in the state long enough to meet the durational residency requirements.
See id. at 331, 92 S.Ct. 995. In an action challenging the residency requirements, the Supreme Court determined that the case was not rendered moot by the fact that he had by then resided in the jurisdiction long enough to vote in the next election.
See id. at 331–32, 92 S.Ct. 995. The Court reasoned that “the laws in question remain on the books, and Blumstein has standing to challenge them as a member of the class of people affected by the presently written statute.”
Id. at 333 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 995. In
Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir.1983), we followed
Dunn stating: “If [election law] cases were rendered moot by the occurrence of an election, many constitutionally suspect election laws ... could never reach appellate review.” Both
Dunn and
Joyner proceeded to the merits without examining the future political intentions of the challengers. Schaefer's challenge is capable of repetition, yet evades review and is therefore not moot.