The State does not respond to Plaintiffs' arguments that the phrase “relevant to the patient's medical care or safety, or the safety of others,” which appears in
§ 790.338(1) and
(2), is unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs contend that, in the context of preventive medicine, information about a patient's use or possession of firearms is always relevant. However, they note, correctly, that to read the relevance standard in that way would render that clause meaningless or superfluous.
See In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 823 (11th Cir.2009) (“We cannot read statutory language in a way that renders it wholly meaningless or nonsensical.”). I agree that this statutory language fails to give practitioners sufficient guidance.
Cf. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048–49, 111 S.Ct. 2720. In the context of preventive medicine, which is a forward-looking practice, it is unclear whether the clause means “relevant at the time of the consult with the patient” or “relevant at any time in the future.” The uncertainty regarding this standard is especially problematic in this case, where it has a chilling effect on speech, and, by extension, on the effectiveness of the practice of preventive medicine. Given the vague contours of what the statute prohibits, “it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection.”
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874, 117 S.Ct. 2329. Consequently, these provisions “lack [ ] the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech.”
Id. I find that these provisions are void for vagueness.