In this case, it is important to note that the Court is unaware of any authority that is directly on point for the question before the Court. The weight of authority, however, counsels toward the finding that supporting the referral of a referendum is likely protected political speech. For example, in
Meyer, the Court noted that, of necessity, “the circulation of an initiative petition ... involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change.”
486 U.S. at 421, 108 S.Ct. 1886. In fact, the Court explicitly stated that the “record in this case demonstrates that the circulation of appellees' petition involved political speech.”
Id., n. 4. Moreover, in
Buckley, the Court held that petition circulation is “core political speech,” because it involves “
interactive communication concerning political change.”
525 U.S. at 187, 119 S.Ct. 636 (quoting
Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422, 108 S.Ct. 1886) (emphasis added). The
Buckley Court also noted that “First Amendment protection for such
interaction ... is at its zenith.”
Id. at 187, 119 S.Ct. 636 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). It would seem that if the circulator is protected by the First Amendment and the process is at the core of the First Amendment, then the people singing the petition in support of referral of the referendum would also be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. In fact, the
Buckley Court touched upon the protection of the “interaction” in the circulation process, which involved a “political conversation” and the “exchange of ideas.”
Id. at 192, 119 S.Ct. 636. By necessity, an interaction involves the circulator as well as one who may support the referral of a referendum. Based on these authorities, the Court finds that it is likely that an individual who supports the referral of a referendum is entitled to protection under the First Amendment.