However, defendants argue that the statute represents a need to further a state interest of the highest order protecting law enforcement-related, corrections officer-related, and court-related employees from harm and intimidation. The Court disagrees. As noted in
The Florida Star, when the government itself places information in the public domain, it must be presumed that the government concludes the public interest is thereby served.
491 U.S. at 535, 109 S.Ct. 2603. Here, the Washington State Court of Appeals made clear that plaintiff has the right to obtain the names of law enforcement-related employees a matter of “legitimate public interest.”
King County v. Sheehan, 114 Wash.App. 325, 345–47, 57 P.3d 307 (2002).
In making this determination, the Court of Appeals specifically considered the fact that plaintiff could use the names to access other personal identifying information from other government sources.
Id. at 332–33, 57 P.3d 307. Although defendants seek to distinguish
The Florida Star as addressing only the state interest of privacy, harm and intimidation was specifically identified as a state interest at issue “the physical safety of such victims, who may be targeted for retaliation if their names become known to their assailants.”
491 U.S. at 537, 109 S.Ct. 2603. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Further, as the Supreme Court reasoned, “punishing the press for its dissemination of information which is already publicly available is relatively unlikely to advance the interests in the service of which the State seeks to act.”
Id. at 535, 109 S.Ct. 2603. Similarly, the “facial underinclusiveness” of the statute raises additional questions about those interests.
Id. at 540, 109 S.Ct. 2603. As plaintiff notes, for-profit commercial entities remain perfectly free to sell, trade, give, or release personal identifying information to third-parties who intend to harm or intimidate individuals purportedly protected by the statute.