Under our form of government voting is not merely a right but a duty, and, moreover, a fundamental and necessary duty if a man is to be a good citizen. It is well to provide that corporations shall not contribute to Presidential or National campaigns, and furthermore to provide for the publication of both contributions and expenditures. There is, however, always danger in laws of this kind, which from their very nature are difficult of enforcement; the danger being lest they be obeyed only by the honest, and disobeyed by the unscrupulous, so as to act only as a penalty upon honest men. Moreover, no such law would hamper an unscrupulous man of unlimited means from buying his own way into office. There is a very radical measure which would, I believe, work a substantial improvement in our system of conducting a campaign, although I am well aware that it will take some time for people so to familiarize themselves with such a proposal as to be willing to consider its adoption. The need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity for thorough organization and machinery, which requires a large expenditure of money. Then the stipulation should be made that no party receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should accept more than a fixed amount from any individual subscriber *837 **188 or donor; and the necessary publicity for receipts and expenditures could without difficulty be provided.18
The unchecked rise in campaign expenditures coupled with the absence of limitations on contributions and expenditures, has increased the dependence of candidates on special interest groups and large contributors. Under the present law the impression persists that a candidate can buy an election by simply spending large sums in a campaign.21
*839 **190 Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?34
This Court has held that when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free *841 **192 expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
(I)t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.
The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice-President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress. . . . Congress reached the conclusion that public disclosure of political contributions, together with the names of contributors and other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections. The verity of this conclusion reasonably cannot be denied. When to this is added the requirement . . . that the treasurer's statement shall include full particulars in respect of expenditures, it seems plain that the statute as a whole is calculated to discourage the making and use of contributions for purposes of corruption.
(Congress) acted in the same spirit and for a similar purpose in passing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act to maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process. See Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545, 54 S.Ct. 287, 290, 78 L.Ed. 484.
Surely it cannot be denied that giving the scope to the resolution for which the Government contends, that is, deriving from it the power to inquire into all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through books and periodicals, however remote the radiations of influence which they may exert upon the ultimate legislative process, raises doubts of constitutionality in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment.
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.
*890 **241 (The President) shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Answer: YES, SUBJECT TO CONSIDERATIONS OF RIPENESS
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing Senators.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants. Electric light the most efficient policeman.
who expends any funds or commits any act directed to the public for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election, or who publishes or broadcasts to the public any material referring to a candidate (by name, description, or other reference) advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, setting forth the candidate's position on any public issue, his voting record, or other official acts (in the case of a candidate who holds or has held Federal Office), or otherwise designed to influence individuals to cast their votes for or against such candidates or to withhold their votes from such candidate(s).
We fail to see how these evils are relevant to the need for controlling campaign expenditures. The “break-in,” the bribery, the “wire tap,” the use of government servants for private political ends, the “cover up,” the various “dirty tricks,” and the other moral and legal deviations characterizing “Watergate” had little or nothing to do with the fact that large sums of money were available to a political party.
Those who won our independence believed that . . . freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical . . ..
legitimate (governmental) interest(s), . . . must be achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party's or an individual candidate's equally important interest in the continued availability of political opportunity.
administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to this Act . . . (and to possess) primary jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions.
The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to this Act and sections 608, 610, 611, 613, *924 **275 614, 615, 616, and 617 of Title 18, United States Code. The Commission has primary jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions.
When we speak of a separation of the three great departments of the *925 **276 government, and maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree. The true meaning is, that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments; and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of a free constitution. This has been shown with great clearness and accuracy by the author of the Federalist. It was obviously the view taken of the subject by Montesquieu and Blackstone in their commentaries; for they were each speaking with approbation of a constitution of government which embraced this division of powers in a general view; but which at the same time established an occasional mixture of each with the others, and a mutual dependency of each upon the others. The slightest examination of the British Constitution will at once convince us that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments are by no means totally distinct and separate from each other.
The Federal Constitution and State Constitutions of this country divide the governmental power into three branches. . . . (T)he rule is . . . in carrying out that constitutional division into three branches it is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power. This is not to say that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of one government and that each in the field of its duties may not invoke the action of the two other branches in so far as the action invoked shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch. In determining what it may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . .
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing Senators.
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
*927 **278 shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
to initiate (through civil proceedings for injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate relief), defend, or appeal any civil action in the name of the Commission for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this Act, through its general counsel;
The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to this Act and sections 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, and 617 of Title 18, United States Code. The Commission has primary jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions.
to formulate general policy with respect to the administration of this Act and sections 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, and 617 of Title 18 (United States Code). . . .
to conduct investigations and hearings expeditiously, to encourage voluntary compliance, and to report apparent violations to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
(I)t may endeavor to correct such violation by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. If the Commission fails to correct the violation through informal methods, it may institute a civil action for relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate order in the district court of the United States for the district in which the person against whom such action is brought is found, resides, or transacts business. Upon a proper showing that such person has engaged or is about to engage in such acts or practices, the court shall grant a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order.
Whenever in the judgment of the Commission, after affording due notice and an opportunity for a hearing, any person has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of this Act or of section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18 (United States Code), upon request by the Commission the Attorney General on behalf of the United States shall institute a civil action for relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate order in the district court of the United States for the district in which the person is found, resides, or transacts business. Upon a proper showing that such person has engaged or is about to engage in such acts or practices, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining *931 **282 order, or other order shall be granted without bond by such court.
with respect to whether any specific transaction or activity by such individual, candidate, or political committee would constitute a violation of this Act, of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of Title 26 (of the U.S.Code), or of section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18 (United States Code).
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person with respect to whom an advisory opinion is rendered under subsection (a) who acts in good faith in accordance with the provisions and findings of such advisory opinion shall be presumed to be in compliance with the provision of this Act, of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of Title 26 (of the U.S.Code), or of section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18 (United States Code), with respect to which such advisory opinion is rendered.
1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
For benefit of all | 64.0% | 53.0% | 51.8% | 40.6% | 43.4% | 21.3% |
Few big interests | 29.0 | 34.0 | 39.2 | 49.6 | 48.4 | 69.9 |
Other/Depends/Both | ||||||
Checked | 4.0 | 6.0 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 2.5 | ---- |
Don't Know | 3.0 | 7.0 | 4.3 | 4.8 | 5.8 | 8.8 |
TOTAL | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
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