(I)t came upon me freshly how the secret of uniform was to make a crowd solid, dignified, impersonal: to give it the singleness and tautness of an upstanding man. This death's livery which walled its bearers from ordinary life, was a sign that they had sold their wills and bodies to the State: and contracted themselves *842 into a service not the less abject for that its beginning was voluntary.
is forced against his will to hold himself out symbolically as a person holding ideas contrary, perhaps, to ideas he holds most dear. Forced dress . . . humiliates the unwilling complier, forces him to submerge his individuality in the “undistracting” mass, and in general, smacks of the exaltation of organization over member, unit over component, and state over individual. I always thought this country does not condone such repression.
The ensuing shouts of book burning, witch hunting and violation of academic freedom hardly elevate this intramural strife to first amendment constitutional proportions. If it did, there would be a constant intrusion of the judiciary into the internal affairs of the school. Academic freedom is scarcely fostered by the intrusion of three or even nine federal jurists making curriculum or library choices for the community of scholars. When the court has intervened, the circumstances have been rare and extreme and the issues presented totally distinct from those we have here.
The School Board feels no less deeply and strongly that the atmosphere of the classroom and attitude of the students are sufficiently affected by teacher's clothing for it to require a necktie and jacket.
(I)t cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
Respondent has sought the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, not as a member of the citizenry at large, but on the contrary as an employee of the police force of Suffolk County, a subdivision of the State of New York. While the Court of Appeals made passing reference to this distinction, it was thereafter apparently ignored. We think, however, it is highly significant.
. . . (W)e are not dealing with personal appearance in what might be termed an individual sense, but in a bilateral sense a contractual relationship. Whatever constitutional aspect there may be to one's choice of apparel generally, it is hardly a matter which falls totally beyond the scope of the demands which an employer, public or private, can legitimately make upon its employees. We are unwilling to think that every dispute on such issues raises questions of constitutional proportions which must stand or fall, depending upon a court's view of who was right.
It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. . . . The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members, and s 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal-court corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees.
We think the answer here is so clear that the District Court was quite right in the first instance to have dismissed respondent's complaint. Neither this Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the District Court is in a position to weigh the policy arguments in favor of and against a rule regulating hairstyles as a part of regulations governing a uniformed civilian service. The constitutional issue to be decided by these courts is whether petitioner's determination that such regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it may be branded “arbitrary,” and therefore a deprivation of respondent's “liberty” interest in freedom to choose his own hairstyle. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, (75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563) (1955).
(W)e are not dealing with personal appearance in what might be termed an individual sense, but in a bilateral sense a contractual relationship. Whatever constitutional aspect there may be to one's choice of apparel generally, it is hardly a matter which falls totally beyond the scope of the demands which an employer, public or private, can legitimately make upon its employees. We are unwilling to think that every dispute on such issues raises questions of constitutional proportions which must stand or fall, depending upon a court's view of who was right.
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