The sparse legislative history of LMRDA
s 101(a)(2) clearly indicates that Congress intended to prevent union reprisals against members who chose to speak and organize in opposition to the union. See 105 Cong.Rec. 6476-77, 6725 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, at 1103, 1238 (1959); see generally, Rothman, Legislative History of the “Bill of Rights” for Union Members, 45 Minn.L.Rev. 199, 210-11 (1960). Nothing in that history, however, suggests that prevention of reprisals was the sole purpose of the provision. On the contrary, the broad language of the provision itself, which protects “the right to meet and assemble freely . . . to express any views, arguments, or opinions . . . ,” 129 U.S.C. s 411(a)(2), suggests that Congress desired to protect the free speech of union dissenters from any inhibiting influence, not just that of direct reprisal. The thrust of the reprisal language in legislative debate and the language of
section 101(a)(2) is the same: a union may not interfere with the expression of ideas or the association of individuals that may be inimical to the union.
Section 101(a)(1) grants to all union members an equal voice in the democratic selection process, and “(s) ection 101(a)(2) carries the legal protection of dissent a step farther by guaranteeing union members freedom of speech both inside and outside union meetings, and also by securing the critics an opportunity to meet for the purpose of organizing their opposition.” Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 834 (1960). We agree with the Second Circuit that:
To effectuate that determination, the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Act, guaranteeing each union member protection against infringement of his rights to vote, to meet, and to participate in discussions on matters of concern to him and his union.