We affirm the lower court's dismissal of Strauss' complaint for failure to state a claim because he has alleged no facts to suggest that the policies of which he complains actually exist. The standard a defendant must meet to have a claim dismissed for this reason is admittedly a high one. Dismissal is improper “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted). To further this end a court must construe pleadings liberally, and mere vagueness or lack of detail does not constitute sufficient grounds for a motion to dismiss. J. Moore and J. Lucas, 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.08 at 2274, 2285 (1984). Still “the lack of intimation of
any facts underlying the [Talley] claim,”
Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir.1981) (emphasis in original), certiorari denied sub nom.
Talley v. Crosson, 460 U.S. 1037, 103 S.Ct. 1426, 75 L.Ed.2d 787, justifies dismissal.
Briscoe also involved a
Section 1983 claim, but for conspiracy. There plaintiff Talley's only allegation of conspiracy contained legal conclusions “wholly devoid of facts,”
id., very similar to the situation at bar. Strauss has identified four separate “custom[s] and practice [s],” one or more of which may have caused his injury (Complaint at 2–3), but the only facts alleged relate to his arrest. Nothing in the complaint suggests that the incident was other than an isolated one unrelated to municipal policy, leading us to affirm the dismissal of the complaint, as we did in
Briscoe with respect to Talley's claim.