many of (the Commission's) other functions remain as yet unexercised, the date of their all but certain exercise is now closer by several months than it was at the time (of the Court of Appeals' ruling). Congress was understandably most concerned with obtaining a final adjudication of as many issues as possible litigated pursuant to the provisions of s 437h. Thus, in order to decide the basic question whether the Act's provision for appointment of the members of the Commission violates the Constitution, we believe we are warranted in considering all of those aspects of the Commission's authority which have been presented by the certified questions.
Appellants make a separate attack on this qualification of the Commission's rulemaking authority, which is but the most recent episode in a long tug of war between the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Federal Government respecting the permissible extent of legislative involvement in rulemaking under statutes which have already been enacted. * * * Because of our holding that the manner of appointment of the members of the Commission precludes them from exercising the rulemaking powers in question, we have no occasion to address this separate challenge of appellants.
Thus, on the assumption that all of the powers granted in the statute may be exercised by an agency whose members have been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause,175 the ultimate question is which, if any, of those powers may be exercised by the present voting Commissioners, none of whom was appointed as provided by that Clause.
45. The Commission decided, after the decision in Buckley v. Valeo, that, even though the thirty legislative days had passed since the regulations were submitted to Congress and no resolution of disapproval had been passed, it would be inappropriate for the Commission to prescribe any regulations prior to Congressional action on bills then pending to reconstitute the Commission as an independent agency.
in some situations it may be that under whatever inherent powers the Government may have, as well as the implicit authority derived from the President's mandate to conduct foreign affairs and to act as Commander in Chief, there is a basis for the invocation of the equity jurisdiction of this Court as an aid to prevent the publication of material damaging to “national security” . . . .
(t)he absence of specific statutory authority for an action by the United States in a particular instance is no obstacle to original jurisdiction under s 1345.
The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.
The Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President of the United States may institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States, including actions for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of this Act . . . (emphasis added).
to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way. . . .64
Significantly, the United States did not claim that the regulations which were propounded and referred and recently lay before Congress under the challenged review provisions are tainted with political interference.
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