(1) The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; (4) if there is a candidate's slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; (5) the extent to which the members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinders their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) whether the political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; (7) the extent to which members of a minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group. Whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivisions' use of such voting qualifications, prerequisite to voting, standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
as a threshold matter ... it is sufficiently large and geographically compact, to constitute a majority in a single-member district.... Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by the structure or practice. [I]f, although geographically compact, the minority group is so small in relation to the surrounding white population that it could not constitute a majority in a single-member district, these minority voters cannot maintain that they would have been able to elect representatives of their choice in the absence of the multimember electoral structure.
Because the resolution of a voting dilution claim requires close analysis of unusually complex factual patterns, and because the decision in such a case has the potential for serious interference with state functions, we have strictly adhered to the Rule 52(a) requirements in voting dilution cases and have required district courts to explain with particularity the reasoning and the subsidiary factual conclusions underlying their reasoning.
Thus, if the minority group is spread evenly throughout a multimember district, or if, although geographically compact, the minority group is so small in relation to the surrounding white population that it could not constitute a majority in a single-member district, these minority voters cannot maintain that they would have been able to elect representatives *473 of their choice in the absence of the multimember electoral structure.
The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting is two-fold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidates. Thus, the question whether a given district experiences legally significant racially polarized voting requires discrete inquiries into minority and white voting practices. A showing that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidate is one way of proving the political cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim ... and, consequently, establishes minority bloc voting within the context of § 2. And, in general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white “crossover” votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting. The amount of white bloc voting that can generally “minimize or cancel” ... [minority] voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice, however, will vary from district to district according to a number of factors, including the nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism; the presence or absence of other potentially dilutive electoral devices, such as majority vote requirements, designated posts, prohibitions against bullet voting; the percentage of registered voters in the district who are members of the minority group; the size of the district; and, in multimember districts, the number of seats open and the number of candidates in the field.
The court finds that it is not unusual that no Indians have been candidates for city office in Sisseton or for county office in Roberts County. The court finds that the enrolled tribal Indian quite naturally looks to the tribal government in the way that white residents look to the city and county government.
Such success might, on occasion, be attributable to the work of politicians, who, apprehending that the support of a black candidate would be politically expedient, campaign to insure his [or her] election. Or such success might be attributable to political support motivated by different considerations—namely that election of a [minority] candidate will thwart successful challenges to electoral schemes on dilution grounds. In either situation, a candidate could be elected despite the relative political backwardness of [minority] residents in the electoral district.
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