Once these crucial differences are recognized, the second of the two issues of exceptional importance becomes apparent. Federal courts must decide only the questions squarely before them. U.S.Const., Art. III, § 2. This case involves a request that a three-judge district court be convened pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2281. The statute, by its terms, covers suits brought to enjoin the “enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute . . .” In addition, the Supreme Court has interpreted
Section 2281 to require the existence of a substantial constitutional question prior to the convening of a three-judge court.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962). The complaint here does seek to enjoin the operation and enforcement of certain portions of the Pennsylvania election code. As a matter of procedure, then, when this Court is asked to rule on the propriety of a denial of a request for a three-judge court, if the other tests for convening such a court are met,
see e. g., Reed Enterprises v. Corcoran, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 354 F.2d 519 (1963), our primary inquiry, and in my view of this case the only inquiry, should go to the substantiality of the constitutional claim asserted. To decide the merits, as the panel did here, is to usurp the function of the three-judge court.