The readily apparent principle is that the jury should, within reason, be informed of all the matters affecting a witness's credibility to aid in their determination of the truth It is just as reasonable that a jury be informed of a witness's mental incapacity at a time about which he proposes to testify as it would be for the jury to know that he then suffered an impairment of sight or *385 hearing. It all goes to the ability to comprehend, know, and correctly relate the truth.
whether under all the circumstances of the particular case, as a practical matter, it is within the capacity of the jurors to follow the court's admonitory instructions and accordingly to collate and appraise the independent evidence against each defendant solely upon that defendant's own acts, statements and conduct. In sum, can the jury keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict as to him? If so, though the task be difficult, severance should not be granted.
In reviewing a claim of undue complexity and confusion, an appellate court looks to the totality of the circumstances in striking a balance between the interest in judicial economy and the need to protect the rights of the individual defendant. A joint trial of twenty-three defendants, charged with conspiracy and numerous substantive counts, clearly raised the possibility that the jury might cumulate the evidence introduced by the Government on all counts and against all defendants to find guilty a defendant whose connection with the conspiracy was at best marginal. The pernicious effect of cumulation, however, is best avoided by precise instructions to the jury on the admissibility and proper uses of the evidence introduced by the Government. The remedy of severance is justified only if the prejudice flowing from a joint trial is clearly beyond the curative powers of a cautionary instruction. Where the Government charges a single conspiracy, as it did here, much of the evidence introduced ultimately bears, at least indirectly, on the agreement of the co-conspirators. Once the Government has satisfactorily established the existence of the conspiracy, the same evidence used to convict a particular defendant is admissible against all co-defendants shown to be members of the conspiracy. Given this state of affairs, the interest in judicial economy understandably exerts strong pressures in favor of a joint trial.
Indeed, only the foolish or exceptionally talented counsel will depend solely on his memory when preparing for the examination of a key witness. But the fact that counsel usually will take notes does not mean that the notes often will be “statements.” Counsel rarely take down verbatim what witnesses say in these preparatory conferences. Consequently, prosecutors' notes may be expected to meet the requirements of (18 U.S.C. s 3500)(e)(2) very infrequently. (Citations omitted.) The notes taken will vary from cryptic “memory jogs” to full summaries of the anticipated testimony.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the government, and must accept all reasonable inferences and credibility choices that tend to support the jury's verdict. (Citations omitted.) The standard of review is whether a jury could reasonably find that the evidence was inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or, put another way, whether a reasonably minded jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute apply to insiders and outsiders those merely “associated with” an enterprise who participate directly and indirectly in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. (Citations omitted.) Thus, the RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise. (Emphasis in original.)
End of Document | © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. |