The regulations at issue here, however, lack the requisite relevant mandatory language. They stop short of requiring that a particular result is to be reached upon a finding that the substantive predicates are met.... [T]he regulations are not worded in such a way that an inmate could reasonably expect to enforce them against the prison officials.
Thus, the respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure “right” to re-employment for the 1969–70 academic year is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifically held that the nonrenewal of a non-tenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Shelton v. Tucker[, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960); Keyishian v. Board of Regents[, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967) ]. We reaffirm those holdings here.
It is clear therefore that First Amendment interests were either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief was sought. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.
The essence of plaintiff's claim ... was that bad prison conditions in general might affect the constitutional rights of Oklahoma State Penitentiary inmates. The general rule, however, is that a plaintiff must assert his own constitutional rights.
the appellees commenced the instant action ... [asserting] First Amendment free speech infringements alleging that appellants had conspired to and had deprived them of their constitutional rights to continue to serve as inmate advisors ... in retaliation for complaints filed with the Warden concerning the performance of David Hindman as Chairman of the Disciplinary Board.
[i]t is important that we review the case presented to the district court rather than a better case fashioned after the district court's order.
It is clear therefore that First Amendment interests were either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief was sought. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.... Since such injury was both threatened and occurring at the time of respondents' motion and since respondents sufficiently demonstrated a probability of success on the merits, the Court of Appeals might properly have held that the District Court abused its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief. (Citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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