Calling, holding, supervising and certifying elections for state district judges in Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar, Travis, Jefferson, Lubbock, Hector and Midland Counties under the current at-large system with an order for interim relief.
Popular sovereignty and popular control of public affairs through the elective system were hallmarks of the Jacksonian era, and, not surprisingly, the movement for popular election of judges dates from this period. Dissatisfaction with the judiciary was widespread among Jacksonians. It arose from several factors including a general disaffection with the legal profession, abuses in the judicial appointment systems, and a feeling, carried over from the Jeffersonian period, that the courts were basically undemocratic. Consequently, the abolition of tenure during good behavior and the adoption of the elective system were advocated as reform measures and were hailed as in accord with the egalitarian spirit of the times.
Citizens of all races are entitled to have an equal chance of electing candidates of their choice, but if they are fairly afforded that opportunity, and lose, the law should offer no redress.
[T]he standard is whether the political processes are equally “open” in that members of a protected class have the same opportunity as others to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.
designed to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2. It thereby restores the legal standards based upon the controlling Supreme Court precedents, which applied in voting discrimination claims prior to the litigation involved in Mobile v. Bolden. The amendment also adds a new subsection to Section 2 which delineates the legal standards under the results test by codifying the leading pre-Bolden vote dilution case, White v. Regester.
The House amendment is needed to clarify the burden of proof in voting discrimination cases and to remove the uncertainty caused by the failure of the Supreme Court to articulate a clear standard in the City of Mobile v. Bolden.... We are not trying to overrule the Court. The Court seems to be in some error about what the legislative intent was.... Prior to Bolden, a violation in voting discrimination cases [could] be shown by reference to a variety of factors that, when taken together, added up to a finding of illegal discrimination. But in Bolden, the plurality appears to have abandoned this totality of circumstances approach and to have replaced it with a requirement of specific evidence of intent ... this is a requirement of a smoking *301 gun, and I think it becomes a crippling blow to the overall effectiveness of the Act.
take the concept of a class's impaired opportunity for equal representation and uncritically transfer it from the context of elections for multi-member bodies to that of elections for single-member offices.... [T]here is no such thing as a “share” of a single-member office.
The Republic of Texas shall be divided into convenient judicial districts, not less than three, nor more than eight. There shall be appointed for each district a judge, who shall reside in the same, and hold the courts at such times and places as Congress may by law direct.
There can be no equal opportunity for representation within an office filled by one person. Whereas, in an election to a multi-member body, a minority class has an opportunity to secure a share of representation equal to that of other classes by electing its members from districts in which it is dominant, there is no such thing as a “share” of a single-member office.
the hallmark of a single member office, as [the Butts and Dillard ] courts use the term, is not the fact that the office is traditionally held by only one individual but, more importantly, the fact that the full authority of that office is exercised exclusively by one individual.
As administrator, the chairperson is likened to sheriffs, probate judges, and tax collectors. For these positions, at-large, non-proportional elections are inherent to their nature as single-person officers elected by direct vote. [Butts ] Such single offices are most commonly limited to non-legislative functionaries. To the extent that the proposed chair position is not purely executive or judicial, Calhoun *307 County further cites the examples of lieutenant governors and vice presidents. These, too, are single-office positions, and although the offices are executive, they include the authority to preside over legislative bodies and break tie votes.
so long as the winner of an election for a single-member office is chosen directly by the votes of all eligible voters, it is unlikely that electoral arrangements for such an election can deny a class an equal opportunity for representation.... The rule in elections for single-member offices has always been that the candidate with the most votes wins, and nothing in the Act alters this basic political principle.
[t]he concept of a class's impaired opportunity for equal representation [cannot be] ... uncritically transfer[ed] from the context of elections for multi-member bodies to that of elections for single-member offices.... [T]here is no such thing as a “share” of a single-member office.
The true hallmark of a single-member office is that only one position is being filled for an entire geographic area, and the jurisdiction can therefore be divided no smaller. While mayors and sheriffs do indeed “hold single-person offices in Alabama,” they do so because there is only one such position for the entire geographic area in which they run for election.... [W]hat is important is how many positions there are in the voting jurisdiction. It is irrelevant, in ascertaining the potential existence of vote-dilution, that these officials happen to exercise the full authority of their offices alone.
In embracing the single official concept, we express the judgment that the state's powerful interest in its structural arrangement of individual trial judges outweighs the potential amelioration of any dilution of minority interests achievable by districting. This is particularly true here, where ... the subdistricting remedy is at best problematic, and is likely perverse. The state's interests include avoiding the fact and appearance of biased decisionmaking, preserving the core attribute of the trial judge—unshared and non-delegable judgment.
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