We agree with McDonald that
Black clearly establishes that the force described in the complaint, if true, was constitutionally proscribed. Although the officer in
Black was acting in an undercover capacity, this is not a sufficient distinction upon which to find Haskins' alleged actions permissible. It is “obviously and inescapably implicit” in
Black that it would be objectively unreasonable for Haskins, in the alleged absence of any danger, to place his gun to the head of a young child and threaten to shoot.
See K.H. ex rel. Murphy, 914 F.2d at 851. That
Black is a Third Circuit case is of no moment; no case has since held to the contrary, and Haskins would have no reason to think that
this Circuit would reject its holding.
See id. at 852. Moreover, the court in
Black found that the officer's behavior met the “shocks the conscience” standard which, as we have previously observed, constitutes an even higher burden for plaintiffs than the objective reasonableness test.
See Titran, 893 F.2d at 147; Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 714 (7th Cir.1987).