In these circumstances, more is involved than the mere failure of the clerk to discharge his duty under F.R.Civ.P. 77(d). There was no prejudice to either side, because neither side knew of the entry of judgment. Counsel promptly filed notice of appeal after the action of the district court vacating and reentering its judgment. Indeed, counsel at all times acted diligently, and relied upon an express assurance from the district court that they need not continue their inquiries. The case had been fought long and hard, and an appeal by one side or the other was virtually certain. We hold that the trial court acted properly in vacating and reentering its judgment under F.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
(1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective.
We do not believe, however, that either United States v. O'Brien [391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) ] or the time, place and manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to the Park Service as the manager of the nation's parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained.
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