Similar to previous cases which employed equal protection analysis in assessing the propriety of various statutes in voter qualification and ballot access cases,
Anderson and
Norman recognize the precious nature of the individual and state rights at issue and the delicate balancing required to achieve electoral harmony.
Anderson and
Norman are also illustrative of the Supreme Court's recent focus on the degree of the burden imposed on the exercise of associational or voting rights as opposed to the “absolute denial” of associational or voting rights which the Court found critical in
Rosario. Thus, the critical distinction between the
McDonald–Rosario line and the
Carrington–Dunn/Anderson–Norman lines is whether the statute at issue imposes a substantial burden on the associational rights or voting rights at stake.
Storer, 415 U.S. at 729, 94 S.Ct. at 1278 (“substantial burdens on the right to vote or associate for political purposes are constitutionally suspect and invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Equal Protection Clause unless essential to serve a compelling state interest.”);
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144, 92 S.Ct. at 856 (“Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise, and because this impact is related to the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate, we conclude, as in
Harper, that the laws must be ‘closely scrutinized.’ ”). If a substantial burden exists, a common sense reading of the cases in both areas suggests that the restrictions on the right to vote must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that state interest. Generally, this is the conventional approach employed in assessing First Amendment deprivations.
Storer, 415 U.S. at 759–62, 94 S.Ct. at 1293–95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).