The facts in
Bullock and
Lubin demonstrate why these cases are inapposite to Kaplan's equal protection claims. In
Bullock, the Supreme Court confronted a Texas statutory scheme which required each candidate to “pay a filing fee as a condition to having his name placed on the ballot in a primary election.”
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 135, 92 S.Ct. at 852 (footnote omitted). The Court emphasized that the fee was “an absolute prerequisite to a candidate's participation in a primary election.”
Id. at 137, 92 S.Ct. at 852. A candidate would not appear on the ballot if the fee were not paid. The Texas system made no exception for candidates who could not afford the fee, even though “the candidates in this case affirmatively alleged that they were
unable, not simply
unwilling, to pay the assessed fees.”
Id. at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 857 (emphasis in original). It provided “no alternative procedure by which a potential candidate who is unable to pay the fee can get on the primary ballot,”
id. at 137, 92 S.Ct. at 852–53, and thereby “exclud[ed] some candidates otherwise qualified [to run for office] and den[ied] an undetermined number of voters the opportunity to vote for candidates of their choice.”
Id. at 149, 92 S.Ct. at 859. The Court determined that the statute was patently exclusionary and therefore invalidated it as a violation of equal protection.