a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to coordinate political department; or lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking *987 independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
And it so happens—more than coincidentally, I think—that in every case in which, prior to the amendment of § 2, we recognized the possibility of a vote dilution claim, the principle of “one person, one vote” was applicable. Indeed, it is the principle of “one person, one vote” that gives meaning to the concept of “dilution.” ... “[O]ne person, one vote” has been the premise and the necessary condition of a vote dilution claim, since it establishes the baseline for computing the voting strength that the minority bloc ought to have .... If Congress was (through use of the extremely inapt word “representatives”) making vote dilution claims available with respect to the election of judges, it was, for the first time, extending that remedy to a context in which “one person, one vote” did not apply.... I frankly find it very difficult to conceive how it is to be determined whether “dilution” has occurred, once one has eliminated both the requirement of actual intent to disfavor, minorities, and the principle that 10,000 nonminority votes throughout the State should have as much practical “electability” effect as 10,000 nonminority votes.... But my point is that “one person, one vote” is inherent in the normal concept of “vote dilution,” and was *988 an essential element of the pre-existing, judicially crafted definition under § 2....
Principles of federalism and separation of powers impose stringent limitations on the equitable power of federal courts. When these principles are accorded their proper respect, Article III cannot be understood to authorize the federal judiciary to take control of core state institutions like prisons, schools, and hospitals, and assume responsibility for making the difficult policy judgments that state officials are both constitutionally entitled and uniquely qualified to make.
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