Ignoring the principle that noncommercial speech is given greater protection than commercial speech, the defendants rely on the fact that one of the grounds on which the ordinance in
Vincent was upheld was its “viewpoint neutrality.” Their reliance is misplaced. The
Vincent Court was not confronted with an ordinance that effectively favored commercial signs to the disadvantage of political messages. Rather, its focus of inquiry was whether the ordinance regulated speech in ways that favored “some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.”
104 S.Ct. at 2128. The defendants seize on this phrasing of the issue to argue that the By-Law is neutral, because it treats all viewpoints the same in that it prohibits all expression. This is not the sort of “neutrality” that concerned the Court in
Vincent. Rather,
Vincent takes as a given the concept that all non-commercial viewpoints and ideas must be afforded more protection than commercial speech. This attitude is evident in the
Vincent Court's apparent willingness to extend the pre-eminent status given political speech to other forms of expression that the plaintiff might term “personal viewpoint” speech. Thus in dismissing the plaintiffs' argument that a narrow exception to the ordinance against posting signs on public property should be made for political signs, the Court stated: