Maryland Citizens Committee for Fair Congressional Redistricting, Inc. v. Tawes | Cases | Westlaw

As above indicated, Chapter 371 of the Acts of 1965, in our opinion, deviates too widely from the constitutional norm of ‘one man, one vote’ to be tolerated. Some departure from the ideal is of course inevitable. The equality which the Constitution commands allows, however, ‘only minor deviations which may occur in the recognition of rational and legitimate factors, free from the taint of arbitrariness, irrationality and discrimination. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 12 L.Ed.2d 620 (1964).’ Drum v. Seawell, 250 F.Supp. 922 (M.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Drum v. Austin, 86 S.Ct. 1237 (Apr. 4, 1966). There is no rational justification for one district exceeding in population the average of all the districts in the state by 14.38%, while another falls below the average by 14.90%— a gross discrepancy of one-third. See Baker v. Clement, 247 F.Supp. 886 (M.D.Tenn.1965) (32% Discrepancy invalid); Roberts v. Babcock, 246 F.Supp. 396 (D.Mont.1965) (46% Discrepancy invalid); Meeks v. Anderson, 229 F.Supp. 271 (D.Kan.1964) (44% Discrepancy invalid). Cf. Grills v. Branigan (S.D.Ind. Feb. 17, 1966) (20% Discrepancy tolerated); Moore v. Moore, 246 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.Ala.1965) (14% Discrepancy tolerated).

Even if a district plan initially comports with the one-to-one formula, discrepancies may be expected to arise with changing conditions. Such discrepancies are unavoidable and must be tolerated for a time, till the next census, but in initial districting the aim should be to come as closely as possible to a one-to-one ratio. There is no showing in this case that the difference of one-third is unavoidable or justified upon any legally acceptable ground. We must therefore *734 declare Chapter 371 of the Acts of 1965 invalid and forbid its submission in the referendum set for the fall elections of 1966.

We do not doubt the power of the court in these circumstances to adopt a redistricting plan to remain in force till the General Assembly adopts its own constitutionally valid plan. Three-judge federal courts have redistricted in at least three instances. Klahr v. Goddard, 250 F.Supp. 537 (D.Ariz. 1966); Roberts v. Babcock, 246 F.Supp. 396 (D.Mont.1965); and see People ex rel. Scott v. Kerner, 33 Ill.2d 460, 211 N.E.2d 736 (1965), where the plan was the product of consultation between the state court and a three-judge federal court. But cf. Park v. Faubus, 238 F.Supp. 62 (E.D.Ark. 1965) (at-large congressional elections ordered); Calkins v. Hare, 228 F.Supp. 824 (E.D.Mich.1964) (same).

The court has thoughtfully considered the respective arguments of the parties and intervenors. Their views are naturally divergent, but in exposing the deficiencies of competing views, each has been of assistance to the court and each has provided a measure of guidance toward a proper solution. Having this advantage, we have endeavored to avoid as far as possible the defects that were pointed out and to avail ourselves as far as possible of whatever is sound in any of the plans submitted. A basic goal has been to achieve the requirements of equality laid down in the Supreme Court decisions without doing unnecessary violence to the heart of existing districts, county lines, and district lines within the counties and ward lines in the city. We think that our plan makes the districts as compact as possible, and in the few cases where it was deemed necessary to split a county we have taken into account the character of the neighborhoods involved. In short, we have given dominant weight, as we think we must, to the population factor, without sacrificing other relevant considerations. In our plan the maximum deviation from the ideal of equality is only 5,624 (1.4%) over the average, in the Second District, and 4,349 (1.1%) below the average, in the Fourth District, so that the maximum deviation in the weight of a vote is only in the ratio of 1 to 1.026.

A difficulty encountered by anyone who undertakes in 1966 to draw district lines with a view to achieving substantial population equality, is that the only accurate figures available are those from the 1960 census. The dilemma presents two possible choices: to accept the 1960 census figures which are not up to date, or to attempt to make estimates of changes in population figures since that date. Neither choice is a happy one, but we have concluded that it is better to adhere to the census figures than to engage in speculative estimates or projections which vary widely with the estimators and the manner in which they handle the figures available to them from various sources. The alternative we have rejected would indeed lead into a mathematical thicket. See Klahr v. Goddard, 250 F.Supp. 537 (D.Ariz. 1966).

It is entirely appropriate to recognize the existence of metropolitan communities. Much of the influx into Baltimore County to the north and Anne Arundel County to the south stems from Baltimore City. The settlements in the county nearest the city consist of people quite like those living on the other side of the City's boundary lines. Present district boundaries are not sacrosanct, and may be extended into neighboring counties, if this is necessary to constitute districts of sufficient size.