(1) the likelihood of plaintiff's success on the merits; (2) whether the injunction will save the plaintiff from irreparable injury; (3) whether the injunction would harm others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served.
The Supreme Court's upholding the restriction on corporations in the then MCFA § 54, does not impel conclusion that the restriction on unions in the now-MCFA § 54 violates the United States Constitution. This Court rejects the application of the maxim of legislature interpretation, ‘inclusio unius est exclusio alterius ’—the inclusion of one (corporations) is the exclusion of all others (unions).
The differing restrictions placed on individuals and unincorporated associations on the one hand, and on unions and corporations, on the other, reflect a judgment by Congress that these entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they therefore may require different forms of regulations in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.
(D)(1) FOR PURPOSES OF THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED IN DIVISION (B)(2) OF THIS SECTION AND THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED IN DIVISIONS (C)(1), (2), (3), (4), AND (5) OF THIS SECTION, WHICHEVER IS APPLICABLE, ALL CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY AND ALL CONTRIBUTIONS ACCEPTED FROM POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES THAT ARE ESTABLISHED, FINANCED, MAINTAINED, OR CONTROLLED BY THE SAME CORPORATION, ORGANIZATION, LABOR ORGANIZATION, CONTINUING ASSOCIATION, OR OTHER PERSON, INCLUDING ANY PARENT, SUBSIDIARY, DIVISION, OR DEPARTMENT OF THAT CORPORATION, ORGANIZATION, LABOR ORGANIZATION, CONTINUING ASSOCIATION, OR OTHER PERSON, ARE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY OR ACCEPTED FROM A SINGLE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE.
(5) For purposes of the limitations provided by paragraph (1) and paragraph (2), all contributions made by political committees established or financed or maintained or controlled by any corporation, labor organization, or any other person, including any parent, subsidiary, branch, division, department, or local unit of such corporation, labor organization, or any other person, or by any group of such persons shall be considered to have been made by a single political committee....
It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when ‘such summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that § 818 is not substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
We unhesitatingly reaffirm the Mitchell [United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947) ] holding that Congress had, and has, the power to prevent Mr. Poole and others like him from holding a party office, working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other party workers. An Act of Congress going no farther would in our view unquestionably be valid. So would it be if, in plain and understandable language, the statute forbade activities such as organizing a political party or club; actively participating in fund-raising activities for a partisan candidate or political party; becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; actively managing the campaign of a partisan candidate for public office; initiating or circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a partisan candidate for public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate or proxy to a political party convention. Our judgment is that neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees.
There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.
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