The defendants claim a state may not sue the federal government in its
parens patriae capacity by citing
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). In a footnote the Court stated “[a] State does not have standing as
parens patriae to bring suit against the Federal Government,”
Id. at 610 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. at 3270 n. 16, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). It is not clear how definitive this assertion is, however. The statement was made in light of a case which did not raise the issue of whether a state might have
parens patriae standing when bringing suit against the United States.
In fact
Mellon, the case which the footnote relied on for its authority, stated “[w]e need not go so far as to say that a state may never intervene by suit to protect its citizens against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress.”
Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485, 43 S.Ct. at 600.
The Eleventh Circuit was faced with deciding a state's capacity to sue in a
parens patriae capacity and recognized
Alfred L. Snapp did not decisively deal with the question.
Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1209 (11th Cir.1989). The
Chiles court declined to rule on the issue because it felt the case was not a proper one with which to break new ground.
Although the situation presented by the case at bar may be a more appropriate one than that in
Chiles, this court, like the Eleventh Circuit, can see no prejudice to the State of Texas in denying it standing since the individual plaintiffs and the class will in all likelihood resolve the State's concerns,
and therefore, declines to find that the State of Texas may sue under in its
parens patriae capacity.