Wesch v. Hunt | Cases | Westlaw

On September 23, 1991, Plaintiff Paul Charles Wesch brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Governor of Alabama, as well as other state officials, contending, inter alia, that the present State law defining congressional districts in the State of Alabama violates Art. I, § 2 of the Constitution. Based on 1990 census data, Wesch specifically alleges that if the 1992 congressional elections were to be held under the present districting plan, it would violate his right to the constitutionally mandated “one-person, one-vote” scheme of representation.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), this three-judge court was convened. On December 9, 1991, Michael Figures and others, who assert a claim under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq., were granted leave to intervene. A two day trial was held.

Having considered the evidence and the post-trial submissions of the parties, the court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

1. The Plaintiff Paul Charles Wesch is a citizen of the United States and is a resident and registered voter in the First Congressional *1493 District of Alabama as presently configured.

2. The Intervenor–Plaintiffs, Michael Figures and others, are African–American citizens of the United States and the State of Alabama. They have been allowed to intervene in this litigation both on their own behalf and on behalf of all African–American citizens of the State of Alabama.

3. It was agreed by all parties, including the Plaintiff–Intervenors, that the complaint of intervention would proceed on an allegation that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been violated, insofar as the class represented by the intervenors had been denied meaningful access to the voting process that would allow them to elect candidates of their choice.

4. The court notes that the original complaint was filed in September, a fact known to the Plaintiff–Intervenors who chose not to intervene until December 4, 1991. Therefore, the Plaintiff–Intervenors were permitted to intervene only after they agreed to comply with all procedures and deadlines in place.

5. The Defendant Guy Hunt is the Governor of Alabama. The Defendant Billy Joe Camp is the Secretary of State of Alabama. The Defendants Lionel W. Noonan, Harry D'Olive, Devon Wiggins, Otha Lee Biggs, Jerry Bogan, Clarence Watters, and Tom W. Turner are the Probate Judges of the seven counties which presently comprise the First Congressional District of Alabama. All Defendants are sued both in their individual and official capacities. All Defendants have significant duties in the administration of congressional elections in Alabama.

6. This court advised the parties of its intent to employ Professor Harold W. Stanley as the court's expert to assist in considering any and all plans for redistricting that might be submitted, and to advise the court on the statistical issues in regard to any possible redistricting. The court extended to the parties the opportunity to state if there were any objections to the court's selection of this expert. No objections were filed. After the trial, the parties were also given the opportunity to object to the statistical information relied on by Professor Stanley, the same information underlying this order. No objections were filed.

7. In 1981, the Alabama Legislature enacted the current version of Ala.Code § 17–20–1 (1987), which divided the state into seven congressional districts. During 1990, the Bureau of the Census of the United States Department of Commerce conducted a census of the United States, including the State of Alabama, pursuant to constitutional authority. On January 16, 1991, the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives notified Governor Hunt that Alabama would retain seven seats in the House of Representatives following the 1990 census. (Statement of Agreed Facts and Exhibit A thereto.)

8. According to the 1990 census, Alabama's total population is 4,040,587 persons. In order to achieve exact population equality among each of Alabama's seven congressional districts, the ideal population of each district would be 577,227 persons. (Statement of Agreed Facts and Exhibit B thereto.)

9. Alabama's most populous congressional district is District 5, which has 603,726 persons. Accordingly, District 5 varies from the “ideal” population by 26,499 persons, or 4.59%. Alabama's least populous congressional district is District 6, which has 532,748 persons. Accordingly, District 6 varies from the “ideal” population by 44,479 persons, or 7.71%. The difference between the populations of the most populous and least populous districts is 70,978 persons, which constitutes a relative overall variance from the ideal population of 12.3%. (Statement of Agreed Facts, Exhibit B.)

10. African–Americans do not constitute a majority in any of Alabama's existing congressional districts. (Statement of Agreed Facts, Exhibit C.) However, according to the 1990 census data, the African–American population in Alabama is sufficiently compact and contiguous to permit the creation of a congressional district in which 65% or more of the residents are African–Americans. The parties agree *1494 that such a district should be created. (Supplemental Stipulation filed January 3, 1992.)

11. On February 8, 1991, the Alabama Legislature received the 1990 census data on magnetic tape from the Bureau of Census, and this information was loaded, as received, into the computer system maintained by the Alabama Legislature's Permanent Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment (“Reapportionment Committee”). The population data in the Reapportionment Committee's computer data base is the official 1990 census data compiled and released by the Bureau of the Census and is accurate and reliable information for redistricting purposes. (Statement of Agreed Facts.) On July 15, 1991, the Secretary of Commerce advised that there would be no adjustment to the 1990 census figures as originally transmitted to the Alabama Legislature.

12. The total population of each existing congressional district is reflected in Appendix A to this opinion. The total population of each existing congressional district by race is reflected in Appendix B; the total population by race of each of Alabama's 67 counties is reflected in Appendix C; and the voting age population by race of each of the 67 counties is reflected in Appendix D. The names, dates when first elected, and home addresses of Alabama's incumbent congressmen are reflected in Appendix E.

13. On April 2, 1991, the Reapportionment Committee adopted a set of guidelines for redistricting. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1; deposition of Marilyn Terry, pp. 24–25.) The Guidelines set forth a fair set of criteria for congressional redistricting. In addition to mandating compliance with population equality or the “one-person, one-vote” rule and the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, these guidelines included the following criteria:

14. The Alabama Legislature adjourned its 1991 regular session on July 29, 1991, without enacting a congressional redistricting plan. (Statement of Agreed Facts, Paragraph 13.) It was argued that the Legislature might delay the primaries for congressional elections, allowing it time to adopt and have precleared a constitutional redistricting plan. If that were done, two primaries would have to be held, entailing added cost to the taxpayers.

15. By statute, Alabama's congressional primaries will be held June 2, 1992. The qualifying deadline for candidates is sixty days prior to the primary, or April 3, 1992.¹ In order for a legislatively-enacted congressional redistricting plan to receive the “preclearance” from the Justice Department required by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, in time for the April 3 qualifying deadline, such a plan should have been submitted to the Justice Department no later than February 3, 1992.

*1495 16. Under Alabama law, the calling of special sessions of the Legislature is a discretionary call on the part of the Governor. Ala. Const. Art. V, § 122. The Governor's answer filed on October 29, 1991, indicated that the Governor did not plan to call a special session of the Legislature for the purposes of redistricting.

17. At the time this case was filed, this court considered it highly unlikely that the legislative process could produce a congressional redistricting plan and have it precleared in time for the 1992 congressional primaries to be held as scheduled. Nothing was presented to this court to indicate that the Legislature would convene for the purpose of adopting a plan of redistricting in time to be precleared for these elections. Nothing was presented to indicate that even if a special session was called for the purpose of considering redistricting, that a successful effort would follow, or that even if the Legislature was allowed to consider the matter after the regular term commenced on February 4, 1992, that a plan would be forthcoming, and if forthcoming, there would be time to have such plan precleared. The court considered this case on a fast track in light of the impending primary. All parties participating in this case were put on notice of this fact.

18. Consequently, the court finds that the only means by which Alabama's 1992 congressional primaries may be held in a timely manner (other than under the current districting scheme which, for reasons enumerated in the Conclusions of Law, the court rejects) is pursuant to an interim redistricting plan ordered by this court.

19. The parties have submitted six proposed redistricting plans to the court for its consideration: (1) the “Reed Plan,” Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 7; (2) the “Sam Pierce Zero Plan,” Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 6 (hereafter the “Pierce Plan”); (3) the “Hilliard Plan,” Intervenors' Exhibits 3 and 3A; (4) the “Unity Plan,” Intervenors' Exhibits 1 and 1A; (5) the “Modified Unity Plan,” Intervenors' Exhibits 2 and 2A; and (6) the “CD25 Plan,” Intervenors' Exhibits 4 and 4A.

20. Of the six plans submitted, only the Reed Plan was considered in its final form by the Reapportionment Committee. The Pierce Plan, however, is a modification of a plan called the “Larry Dixon Plan” which was considered by the Reapportionment Committee. The Pierce Plan modified the Larry Dixon Plan to some extent, but the basic format is similar. The Legislature of the State of Alabama created an Interim Task Force on Reapportionment by Act # 87–356. By Act $ 90–388 that task force became the staff to the Permanent Committee on Reapportionment of the Alabama Legislature. The task force scheduled a series of public hearings in regard to redistricting matters, and under the instructions given to the Reapportionment Committee, as set forth in the Guidelines for Legislative and Congressional Redistricting, the Reapportionment Committee meetings and public hearings were open to the public and all plans presented to the Reapportionment Committee were to be made available to the public for its input. These public meetings were held in accordance with the schedule outlined in the appendix to the motion to dissolve filed by Evans (Tab $ 14). Among those plans considered by the Reapportionment Committee, and one that apparently was to be presented to the Legislature, was the Larry Dixon Plan.

The Reapportionment Committee conducting the hearings was made up both African–Americans and Whites. Public input to the Reapportionment Committee in regard to the respective plans was from both African–Americans and Whites.

21. Neither The Pierce Plan nor the Larry Dixon Plan was adopted by the Alabama Legislature.

22. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Legislature has since adopted a plan which substantially differs from any plan that was submitted to this court. We also note the fact that the adopted Plan has neither been precleared by the Justice Department nor approved by the District Court for the District of Columbia.

23. Only two of the plans submitted—the Pierce Plan and the Reed Plan—achieve population equality among the districts. *1496 Under the Pierce Plan two districts contain one person less than the ideal district population of 577,227. Under the Reed Plan, one district has two fewer voters than the ideal. The Hilliard Plan has a total deviation of .71% and an average deviation of .63%. The Modified Unity Plan shows a deviation of 1.6% with an average of .52%. The Unity Plan exhibits a total deviation of 1.15% and an average of .27%. Finally, the CD25 Plan has a deviation of .02%. Deviations in all these plans are not justified by any particular goal or interest.

24. Both the Pierce and Reed Plans contain a district with more than 65% African–American population. Under the Pierce Plan, District 7 contains an African–American population comprising 67.69% of the total residents of that District and 63.58% of that District's voting age residents. These percentages slightly exceed those in the majority African–American district (District 4) created by the Reed Plan: 66.69% total population and 62.93% voting age population. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 3; TR 15–16.) More significantly, as of December 1990, the African–American percentage of registered voters in the Pierce Plan's District 7 was 55.55%, which is 3% greater than the African–American percentage of registered voters in the Reed Plan's District 4.

25. Both the Reed Plan and the Pierce Plan provide African–Americans in Alabama with a substantial majority so as to permit them an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The district in the Pierce Plan is slightly more weighted because it includes higher percentages of African–Americans in total population, voting age population and registered voter population.

26. The Hilliard Plan includes two majority African–American districts, with an African–American population of 59.33% and 61.98% respectively. Although this plan was submitted by the intervenors, they took the position that the Hilliard Plan probably provided obstacles of sufficient nature to cast doubt on their opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in these districts.

27. There are significant differences between the Pierce Plan and the Reed Plan in terms of compactness of their districts. District 1 of the Pierce Plan includes six closely contiguous counties in southwest Alabama, whereas District 1 under the Reed Plan includes Mobile County to the south and Tuscaloosa County to the north. District 2 under the Pierce Plan is largely composed of counties in the southeast corner of the state, while the Reed Plan's District 2 stretches from Mobile County, in the extreme southwest corner of the State, to Lee County, in east central Alabama. The Pierce Plan is superior to the Reed Plan in terms of compactness.²

28. The Pierce Plan maintains the integrity of individual voting precincts to a far greater degree than does the Reed Plan. The Pierce Plan splits only 10 voting precincts statewide, whereas the Reed Plan splits at least 57. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 3.) A redistricting plan should minimize precinct splitting when possible because of administrative problems encountered in the conduct of elections when precincts are split.

Furthermore, it is possible to construct a majority African–American district in Alabama using precincts as building blocks.

29. The Pierce Plan splits seven counties. The Reed Plan splits eight counties. The Hilliard Plan splits thirty-one counties.

30. The Pierce Plan also maintains the cores of existing districts to a much greater extent than the Reed Plan. Again, the most striking differences between the *1497 plans in this regard are apparent in Districts 1 and 2. There are also significant differences in District 3. The following table reflects the percentage of residents of existing Districts 1, 2, and 3 who remain in those districts under the Pierce and Reed Plans:

31. As a consequence of its apparent disregard for maintaining the cores of existing Districts 1 and 2, the Reed Plan would also separate the incumbent congressmen in those districts from a large percentage of their current constituents. Under the Reed Plan, Congressman Callahan, the incumbent in the present District 1, would be placed in District 2. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20.) District 2 under the Reed Plan contains only 25.6% of Congressman Callahan's existing constituents. Likewise, the Reed Plan would place Congressman Dickinson, the present incumbent in District 2, in District 3 against District 3's incumbent, Congressman Browder. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20.) 75.0% of the current residents of District 3—Congressman Browder's present constituents—are included in the Reed Plan's District 3. However, only 19.0% of Congressman Dickinson's present constituents are included in that District.

32. Another consequence of the Reed Plan's distortion of Districts 1 and 2 is that the Pierce Plan better preserves the communities of interests in those two districts.

33. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to the authority contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2284 and 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq.

34. Congressional redistricting is primarily and foremost a state legislative responsibility. It is therefore with great reluctance that we order an interim plan to become effective for the upcoming 1992 elections. It is out of deference to the Legislature that we have delayed our ruling until this time. In fact, we have afforded it every opportunity to fashion its own plan in order that it could fulfil its responsibility under the Constitution.³

35. Unfortunately, the Legislature has not yet precleared its adopted plan so that it can be in place for the impending elections, and we are bound by the Constitution not to permit these elections under the present districts.⁴

36. First and foremost, any court ordered redistricting plan must achieve precise population equality among its districts. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969). This is to ensure that “as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election will be worth as much as another's.” *1498 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8, 84 S.Ct. at 530. Put another way, Art. I, § 2 prohibits any population deviations among districts in a congressional redistricting plan without proper justification. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531, 89 S.Ct. at 1229.

37. Among the plans submitted, only two meet this rigorous standard⁵—the Pierce Plan and the Reed Plan. All the other plans which were submitted have unacceptable deviations. Further, none of the proponents of these plans provide an adequate justification for the deviation and we have “no authority to depart from the constitutional mandate of perfect equality in order to achieve some non-constitutional policy” that we believe will serve the public good.⁶ Connor, 431 U.S. at 417, 97 S.Ct. at 1835.

38. If it is possible under constitutional restrictions, a court should consider expressed state policies and preferences. The Reapportionment Committee established guidelines by which to measure a proposed apportionment plan. These guidelines reflect constitutional considerations established by case and statutory law. Any redistricting plan should take into consideration: compactness/contiguity; preservation of political subdivisions; maintenance of communities of interest; and preservation of the core areas of existing districts.

39. Compactness addresses the geographic shape of districts. The most compact district is the district that is configured in the smallest possible area. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 756–57, 103 S.Ct. at 2673–74. Preservation of political subdivisions promotes efficient representation, empowers a constituency's ability to organize productively, and serves as a deterrent to partisan gerrymandering. Burton v. Hobbie, 561 F.Supp. 1029, 1035 (M.D.Ala.1983); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 91 S.Ct. 1803, 29 L.Ed.2d 352 (1971). Protecting communities of interest is meant to keep intact “distinctive units which share common concerns with respect to one or more identifiable features such as geography, demography, ethnicity, culture, socio-economic status or trade.” Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68 (D.C.Colo.1982). Preserving cores of existing congressional districts prevents needless modifications and avoids pitting two incumbent congressmen against one another. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 2663. Based on the findings made above, we conclude that the Pierce Plan better satisfies the above criteria than does the Reed Plan, or any of the other plans.

40. With regard to the majority African–American district, the parties entered into the following stipulation:

41. Therefore, having followed the mandate in Karcher, while keeping in mind the desirability of preserving compactness, cores of all districts, communities of interest, and political subdivisions, we adopt the Pierce Plan except to the extent mentioned below.⁷

First, we have discovered no justifiable basis for the fact that the Pierce Plan places Congressman Erdreich and Congressman Harris in the same district. The Supreme Court has recognized the policy of “avoiding contests between incumbent representatives” as a legitimate objective. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 2663. See also Burton v. Hobbie, 561 F.Supp. at 1035. Accordingly, we have modified the Pierce Plan so that the two congressmen will not be in the same district. Second, in working to achieve zero population deviation and redesign Districts 6 and 7, the affected districts were made marginally more compact in Jefferson and Tuscaloosa counties.

42. The court adopts a redistricting plan to be used in the conduct of congressional elections for the State of Alabama (to be called “The 1992 Alabama Redistricting Plan”) in the event the Alabama Legislature fails to have precleared a redistricting plan in time for the conduct of those elections without delay under applicable state and federal laws. The plan is verbally described in Appendix A to Professor Stanley's report dated January 22, 1992. (See Order, Doc. # 97). Appendix B to that report is a map depicting the plan. The map is appended simply to illustrate the plan, and Appendix A shall control in the event of any conflict between it and Appendix B. Appendix C to that report includes certain statistical data which the court finds to be accurate, none of the parties having posed objections to that data in response to this court's order.

43. A motion pending seeks a stay of any order by this court adopting a plan pending preclearance. We have reserved ruling on the motion until now. We conclude that there is no requirement that the plan which we now adopt be precleared before it becomes operative.⁸

44. First, the plan that we now adopt is a “court decreed” plan. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 91 S.Ct. 1760, 29 L.Ed.2d 268 (1971). It is clear that a plan must be precleared only if it is a “legislative plan.” *1500 McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 137, 101 S.Ct. 2224, 2229–30, 68 L.Ed.2d 724 (1981). “[T]he essential characteristic of a legislative plan is the exercise of legislative judgment ... [that is], a proposal reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people....” Id. at 152–53, 101 S.Ct. at 2238. See also 28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1991) (stating that, in general, “changes affecting voting that are ordered by a federal court are subject to the preclearance requirements of section 5 to the extent that they reflect the policy choices of the submitting authority.”).

The plan which this court adopts today is substantially the same as the plan offered by Plaintiff Wesch. Neither he, nor the party he is affiliated with, can claim to be exercising legislative judgment. We are certain that the Pierce Plan does not reflect the policy choices of the elected representative of the people. Cf. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 101 S.Ct. 2224, 68 L.Ed.2d 724 (1981) (holding that a reapportionment plan submitted to a court by the legislative body of a covered jurisdiction was a legislative plan); Campos v. City of Baytown, Texas, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that plan proposed by the city was a legislative plan), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905, 109 S.Ct. 3213, 106 L.Ed.2d 564 (1989); Farnum v. Burns, 561 F.Supp. 83, 92 (D.R.I.1983) (holding that plan drafted by a legislative consultant under the direction of the legislative body reflected the policy choices of the elected representative and was therefore a legislative plan).

45. Alternatively, it appears that the Legislature will not have a plan precleared in time to be in place for the April 3, 1992 qualifying deadline. For that reason, the situation calls for emergency action by this court. The Supreme Court acknowledged this exception to preclearance in Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 44, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 1522–23, 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982):

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is Denied.

46. We find that, at a minimum, district lines should become fixed one week prior to the April 3, 1992 qualifying date for candidates to allow both candidates and election officials the necessary time to evaluate them and choose their future conduct accordingly.

Congressional redistricting is a state legislature's fundamental task, but it becomes a judicial duty when a legislature fails to adopt and preclear a plan after having adequate opportunity to do so.

At the time this opinion is released, it is reported, although evidence of such is not before the court, that the Alabama legislature has passed a redistricting plan. It is also reported that the plan has not received preclearance by the Attorney General of the United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Since this court recognizes that congressional redistricting is properly a matter to be determined by the legislature and that the federal courts should intervene only if the legislature fails to act in a constitutional manner, the question arises: Why should the court not consider the legislature's belatedly adopted plan and, if it is found by the court to comply with constitutional and legal requirements, adopt this expression of the legislative will as the court's plan *1501 and order it into effect immediately? The answer is that this court has no legal authority to do so.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a legislative plan to be submitted to the Attorney General for approval before it can be put into effect. The Attorney General has a period of 60 days to study the plan and express any objections he might have to it or to any of its provisions.

The Supreme Court has made clear that this requirement of the Voting Rights Act cannot be put aside by having a legislative plan approved by a federal district court (other than the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia). McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. at 130, 101 S.Ct. at 2224; United States v. Board of Supervisors, 429 U.S. 642, 97 S.Ct. 833, 51 L.Ed.2d 106 (1977).

Thus, if we adopted the reported legislative plan, it would still be subject to the preclearance requirement, which might well require postponement of the primaries. This we are unwilling to do.

It should be clearly understood that this court does not wish to compete with the state legislature as to where congressional district lines should be drawn. It is, however, our responsibility to ensure that the voters of this state have the opportunity to choose their members of Congress from constitutionally drawn districts when elections are held at the time set by state law.

If the plan reportedly adopted by the legislature should be precleared by some expedited method no later than 12:00 noon, Central Time, March 27, 1992, one week before the statutory deadline for candidates to qualify to run, as set out herein, then that plan will take effect and those will be the congressional districts for the 1992 election. Otherwise, the legislature will have defaulted in its obligation to the people of the state and the plan described herein will take effect.

The plan adopted by this court shall become operative and controlling for the 1992 congressional elections. Additionally, it shall govern the conduct of congressional elections after 1992 unless and until the Legislature for the State of Alabama adopts a plan and has it precleared in time for such elections to proceed without delay under applicable law.

The court will by separate document enter judgment consistent with this opinion.

It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows:

1. It is declared that Ala.Code § 17–20–1 (1987), as it read prior to its amendment in 1992, if applied to congressional elections in 1992, violates Art. I, § 2 of the United States Constitution.

2. The defendants, individually, and their successors, agents, employees, attorneys, and those persons otherwise acting in concert or in participation with them who receive actual notice of this order, are ENJOINED from:

(a) conducting congressional elections in the State of Alabama under the districting plan heretofore established by Ala.Code § 17–20–1 (1987) as that section read prior to its 1992 amendment;

(b) failing to conduct congressional elections in 1992 in accordance with a redistricting plan adopted by this court and called “The 1992 Alabama Redistricting Plan,” which is verbally described in Appendix A to this order. [Page 1512.] Appendix B to this order is a map depicting the plan. [Page 1582.] (The map is appended simply to illustrate the plan, and Appendix A shall control in the event of any conflict between it and Appendix B). Provided, however, that the injunction contained in this paragraph (b) shall not be effective if the Alabama Legislature duly enacts a redistricting plan for the conduct of congressional elections in 1992 and has the same precleared no later than 12:00 noon, Central Time, March 27, 1992; and

(c) failing to conduct congressional elections in calendar years after 1992 in accordance with the 1992 Alabama Redistricting Plan described in paragraph (b) above. Provided, however, that the injunction contained in this paragraph (c) shall not be effective in the event the Alabama Legislature *1502 duly enacts a redistricting plan and has the same precleared in accordance with federal law in time for congressional elections to proceed without delay under then applicable state and federal law.