The majority also contends that
City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 103 S.Ct. 998, 74 L.Ed.2d 863 (1983) supports its conclusion, but in that case the Supreme Court reversed a three-judge district court panel and “conclude[d] that the
election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color or membership in a language minority group.”
Id. 103 S.Ct. at 1004. In so holding, the Court adopted the position of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, who dissented in
Lockhart because “the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not enhanced, would not be diminished one whit.”
City of Lockhart v. United States, 559 F.Supp. 581, 595 (D.D.C.1981) (S. Robinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoted in
City of Lockhart v. United States, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 1004). As the majority recognizes, the Court did not consider the “purpose” prong of
section 5 in
Lockhart because the district court panel had not reached that issue. See
City of Lockhart v. United States, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 1001 & n. 4; Maj. Op. at 1458. However, unlike the other cases relied upon by my colleagues,
Lockhart involved a fact situation where the existing voting rights of minorities were being altered. Judicial decisions such as
Lockhart which involve factual situations where minority voting rights are changed are simply not applicable to situations where there is no change whatsoever in the existing voting rights of minorities and where any changes which might take place in the future are speculative.