The Supreme Court's decision in
Buckley suggests just the opposite. When examining the intrusiveness of the statute's regulations on first amendment freedoms, the Court found that a limitation on coordinated expenditures was justified in order to stem “the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46, 96 S.Ct. at 647–48. Although the Court found the justification for regulating coordinated expenditures outweighed the infringement on the First Amendment, this conclusion does not create a carte blanche for expansive regulation of coordinated expenditures. On the contrary, the fact that
section 441a(d)(3) implicates first amendment freedoms argues for adoption of the more narrowly defined “express advocacy” interpretation in order to minimize intrusions.
Moreover, as
Buckley notes, the limitation on contributions by state political committees, “[r]ather than undermining freedom of association, ... enhances the opportunity of bona fide groups to participate in the election process.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 33, 96 S.Ct. at 642. Given that the effect of the regulation is to enhance the political freedom of committees, I find that the “express advocacy” standard, which is a less intrusive limitation on a committee's freedom, is consistent with the Act's purpose. I do not find any compelling justification within the Commission's advisory opinion, nor in plaintiff's argument, for expanding
Buckley 's carefully circumscribed exception to its prohibition against regulation of freedom of speech.