TABLE A | |||
---|---|---|---|
------- | |||
Minority Population In Graves Plan House Districts | |||
---|---|---|---|
(In Percentages) | |||
District | Black | Hispanic | Minority a |
---|---|---|---|
Number | Population | Population | Population |
33C | 53.3 | 20.6 | 73.9 |
33F | 22.2 | 31.3 | 53.5 |
33G | 57.9 | 8.0 | 65.9 |
33K | 31.7 | 27.1 | 58.8 |
33N | 85.4 | 2.4 | 87.8 |
33O | 63.0 | 19.8 | 82.8 |
(Source: 1983 Joint Exh. 2.) |
TABLE B | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
------- | ||||||
Comparison of Black, Hispanic and Minority Composition of Selected | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dallas County Districts under 1983 House Plan | ||||||
and MALDEF Plans (in percentages) | ||||||
LEGEND: Pop. = Population | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
VAP = Voting Age Population | ||||||
I. 1983 House Plan | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Black | Black | Hispanic | Hispanic | Minority a | Minority a | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
District | Pop. | VAP | Pop. | VAP | Pop. | VAP |
100 | 65.88 | 61.86 | 12.49 | 11.06 | 78.03 | 72.77 |
103 | 20.73 | 18.63 | 35.54 | 28.98 | 56.08 | 47.52 |
107 | 26.65 | 24.15 | 29.01 | 23.81 | 55.33 | 47.78 |
110 | 69.90 | 65.41 | 3.57 | 3.24 | 73.18 | 68.44 |
111 | 65.73 | 60.91 | 10.10 | 8.56 | 75.50 | 69.26 |
II. MALDEF I House Plan | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
100 | 63.63 | 58.43 | 12.17 | 10.98 | 75.44 | 69.22 |
103 | 22.67 | 20.23 | 42.50 | 36.50 | 64.98 | 56.65 |
107 | 37.45 | 34.31 | 23.37 | 19.46 | 60.47 | 53.63 |
110 | 71.47 | 65.19 | 3.27 | 2.84 | 74.46 | 67.83 |
111 | 61.15 | 54.74 | 9.83 | 8.07 | 70.68 | 62.65 |
III. MALDEF II HOUSE PLAN | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
100 | 65.39 | 59.44 | 10.39 | 9.64 | 75.41 | 68.88 |
103 | 27.01 | 24.96 | 40.30 | 34.51 | 67.06 | 59.29 |
107 | 26.28 | 23.28 | 24.75 | 20.32 | 50.76 | 43.50 |
110 | 65.68 | 62.58 | 4.69 | 4.03 | 70.09 | 66.42 |
111 | 65.78 | 61.73 | 5.18 | 4.43 | 70.65 | 65.96 |
103 | 31.59 | b | 16.61 | b | 48.20 c | b |
108 | 69.03 | b | 6.17 | b | 75.20 c | b |
110 | 67.38 | b | 7.15 | b | 74.53 c | b |
111 | 67.79 | b | 3.38 | b | 71.17 c | b |
113 | 14.18 | 14.29 | 51.43 | 43.66 | 65.61 c | 57.83 |
(Source: 1983 Joint. Exh. 2; 1983 P-I Exhs. 3A, 37.) |
Vote dilution occurs when an at-large election plan is used to cancel out the voting strength of a substantial minority population. Typically, a relatively small geographic area of a municipality will be occupied by a minority group which would constitute a majority or a near majority of a single member district if an election-by-district voting scheme was used instead of an at-large scheme.
Racially polarized voting would have various statistical degrees ... but one could still have a finding of highly polarized voting and you could still elect a minority person ... but it might very well be that the person [is] elected along the lines of receiving nine out of ten votes in the minority precincts and maybe twenty votes—twenty percent of the votes in non minority precincts .... If the phenomenon exists you have to take into consideration any kind of plan you draw for future elections.
Plaintiffs proved a long history of denial of access to the political process. That history of official action is one of purposeful and intentional discrimination. The structure and the residual effects of the past have been removed and replaced by current access. The supervisors' reapportionment plan, though racially neutral, will perpetuate the denial of access. By fragmenting a geographically concentrated but substantial black minority in a community where bloc voting has been a way of life the plan will cancel or minimize the voting strength of the black minority and will tend to submerge the interests of the black community.
Inevitably, people of different races, national origins, and contrasting tenets will be shifted under reapportionment plans into districts in which they may no longer be in the clear majority. But, when, as here, no racial motivation spawns a change in the voting area of those complaining, and the redistricting plan does not unconstitutionally dilute the voting strength of the minority, there is no abridgment of voting rights.
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