Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen | Cases | Westlaw

*1 This matter comes before the court on the application of appellants, the duly elected members of the Board of School Commissioners of the city of Indianapolis (School Board), to stay an injunction pending appeal and on the response of appellees, Indianapolis Education Association (Association), Maurice Huckleberry, Preston Roney, and Frederic M. Hadley, Jr.

On June 12, 1969, plaintiffs-appellees brought a complaint to the district court alleging that defendants-appellants had interfered with rights of plaintiffs-appellees secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and prayed that defendants' appellants be enjoined from continuing to interfere with such rights pending final determination of the action.

On June 19, the district court granted preliminary injunction. On June 24, the defendants-appellants moved to stay the injunction and filed a notice of appeal to this court. On July 24, the district court denied the defendants-appellants' motion to stay injunction pending appeal. An appeal was taken and the record and briefs were filed in this court on July 29 and August 5.

On May 21, 1969, pursuant to a consent agreement entered into on May 14 by the School Board and the Association, a representation election was held among the teachers of Indianapolis to determine whether they desired the Association to be their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining. In the consent agreement, the Board agreed to recognize the winner as the exclusive representative and to bargain in good faith with it. The election was supervised by the Indiana Division of Labor; the Association received approximately 95% of the valid ballots cast; the results were certified by the Division on May 23.

The complaint brought to the district court alleged various unilateral acts on the part of the School Board said to be in violation of the teachers' rights of free speech, association and petition guaranteed by the First Amendment, and equal protection, privileges and immunity of citizens of the United States, and due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It alleged that on May 20 the School Board unilaterally adopted a salary benefit schedule for the following school year: that on May 21, 22, and 23, the School Board mailed individual contracts to teachers for their signature and return accompanied by a letter to the effect that this was the best that the Board could do. In addition, the complaint generally alleged a failure to bargain in good faith on the part of the School Board subsequent to May 14.

The district court enjoined defendants-appellants from bargaining individually with any of the teachers, from validating or recognizing as a valid legal document any contract signed by a teacher, or from interfering or attempting to interfere in any other manner with a teacher in the exercise of his right to bargain collectively.

Defendants-appellants' motion to stay both here and in the district court asserts that the injunction seriously disturbed the status quo, that it interfered with the performance of certain statutory duties with respect to salary schedules, teachers contracts, and annual budgets, and that it has hindered its court-imposed obligation to make mandatory transfers-that there is “a pressing need to know, as soon as possible, how many of the School Board's incumbent teachers, and which of them, will accept employment by the School Board for the coming year.”

*2 It appears that because the time element is crucial in this litigation, as the school year is rapidly approaching and the need to get teachers under contract either through individual negotiations or collective bargaining is compelling, a decision on whether or not to grant the stay will at least for the present year in all likelihood have the effect of a determination on the merits. This consideration weighs heavily on this court in framing this order.

There is no question that the right of teachers to associate for the purpose of collective bargaining is a right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Nothing in this order is meant to in any way dilute this proposition. Nor can it be doubted that actions under color of law which infringe upon this fundamental right may be properly enjoined by a federal court.

The factual allegations of the complaint, however, do not support allegations that First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs-appellees were violated by defendants-appellants. Rather, the complaint alleges that the teachers had in fact joined the Association which is in fact now engaged in collective bargaining on their behalf. Thus, the acts from May 14 through May 27 alleged to be in violation of associational rights were rendered moot by the election and operation of the Association.

The gravamen of the complaint goes to the failure on the part of the defendants-appellants to bargain collectively in good faith. But there is no constitutional duty to bargain collectively with an exclusive bargaining agent. Such duty, when imposed, is imposed by statute. The refusal of the defendants-appellants to bargain in good faith does not equal a constitutional violation of plaintiffs-appellees' positive rights of association, free speech, petition, equal protection, or due process. Nor does the fact that the agreement to collectively bargain may be enforceable against a state elevate a contractual right to a constitutional right.

The allegations of the complaint certainly suggest the possibility that if this were an employment covered by LMRA, the School Board would be found by the NLRB to have committed an unfair labor practice. Such a possibility, however, does not argue for a federal court's assumption of jurisdiction on constitutional grounds.

We believe that there is great probability that the action must ultimately be dismissed.

Accordingly,