T.C.A. 9–8–307(a)(1)(N) gives the Claims Commission jurisdiction over claims based on negligent deprivation of statutory or constitutional rights. This was done in part to encourage people to use the Claims Commission to file their lawsuits rather than going to federal court. Since we had done that, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 cannot be based on negligent conduct. Therefore, we're deleting the word “constitutional” from the bill so that negligent conduct is not one of those that would be brought in lieu of a 1983 civil rights action.
the applicable statute of limitations in a particular cause will be determined according to the gravamen of the complaint.
The State insists that the claim does not sound either in negligence or in contract. T.C.A. § 9–8–307(a)(1)(N) (Supp.1988) gives the Commission the authority to hear claims arising from the negligent deprivation of statutory or constitutional rights. The Tennessee Department of Corrections is required by statute to furnish medical care to prisoners in its custody. As an inmate in a state correctional institution, Mr. Bryson had the statutory right to receive medical treatment at the State's expense. It follows that the Tennessee Claims Commission, under T.C.A. § 9–8–307(a)(1)(N), has jurisdiction to decide a claim brought by Mr. Bryson for deprivation for that statutory right.
The narrow issue raised here is whether plaintiff's 1983 action “accrued” under this statute upon the date when Dunn successfully *427 defended the criminal charges against him in the Tennessee Court.
this Court finds that favorable termination of the prior criminal proceeding marks the point at which a 1983 claim for malicious prosecution accrues.
Since federal law does not define the elements of the claim, we adopt the common law rule that favorable termination of the proceedings is essential. Consequently, the claim does not accrue until the proceedings are terminated.
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit. (Footnotes omitted).
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