IIRIRA Provision Governing Admission Does Not Apply Retroactively: US Supreme Court | Practical Law

IIRIRA Provision Governing Admission Does Not Apply Retroactively: US Supreme Court | Practical Law

In Vartelas v. Holder, the US Supreme Court held that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) does not apply retroactively to disable lawful permanent residents convicted of certain pre-IIRIRA offenses from taking short trips abroad.

IIRIRA Provision Governing Admission Does Not Apply Retroactively: US Supreme Court

Practical Law Legal Update 7-518-7386 (Approx. 4 pages)

IIRIRA Provision Governing Admission Does Not Apply Retroactively: US Supreme Court

by PLC Labor & Employment
Published on 29 Mar 2012USA (National/Federal)
In Vartelas v. Holder, the US Supreme Court held that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) does not apply retroactively to disable lawful permanent residents convicted of certain pre-IIRIRA offenses from taking short trips abroad.

Key Litigated Issues

On March 28, 2012, the US Supreme Court issued an opinion in Vartelas v. Holder. The key litigated issue was whether Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) applies retroactively to disable a lawful permanent resident (LPR) convicted of certain pre-IIRIRA offenses from taking short trips abroad.

Background

Vartelas had been an LPR since 1989. In 1994, he pleaded guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude (conspiracy to make a counterfeit security) and served a four-month prison sentence. In 2003, following a one week trip abroad, he was treated as an inadmissible alien and placed in removal proceedings.
At the time of Vartelas' guilty plea, LPRs convicted of certain crimes could travel abroad for brief periods without risking their status as LPRs of the US (Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)). The grounds under which foreign nationals may be removed from the US are contained in two separate sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under pre-IIRIRA law, foreign nationals:
The grounds of exclusion and deportation are not identical. In Varetelas' case, his conviction rendered him excludable but not deportable. Fleuti established the doctrine that LPRs who took brief, casual and innocent trips abroad were not seeking entry on return to the US, and therefore the grounds of exclusion did not apply to them. Under Fleuti, Vartelas was able to make short trips abroad without risking his LPR status.
However, IIRIRA superseded Fleuti. Under IIRIRA, Congress determined that an LPR returning from a trip abroad is requesting admission and subject to the grounds of exclusion if they committed an offense identified under Section 1182(a)(2), Title 8 of the US Code, including:
  • A crime involving moral turpitude.
  • Conspiracy to commit a crime involving moral turpitude.
At his deportation hearing, Vartelas' initial attorneys conceded removal and requested discretionary relief. The immigration judge denied the relief, and ordered Vartelas removed to Greece. The BIA affirmed the decision. Vartelas later filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings, unsuccessfully arguing that:
  • His previous attorneys were ineffective for conceding his removability.
  • IIRIRA's admission provision did not reach back to deprive him of his LPR status based on his pre-IIRIRA conviction.
The BIA denied the motion. Vartelas appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In affirming the BIA's decision, the Second Circuit:
  • Rejected Vartelas' argument that the IIRIRA operated prospectively and therefore did not govern his case.
  • Reasoned that he had not relied on pre-IIRIRA law in force when he committed the disqualifying crime.
The US Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the split between the circuits on this issue.

Outcome

In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Second Circuit. Vartelas argued that:
  • The principle against retroactive legislation established in Landgraf v. USI Film Products applies. The court should therefore read the law as prospective in application because Congress has not unambiguously instructed retroactivity (511 U.S. 244 (1994)).
  • Applying IIRIRA would ban Vartelas from traveling outside the US, which attaches a new disability regarding a pre-IIRIRA conviction.
The court relied on INS v. St. Cyr in its analysis (533 U.S. 289 (2001)). In St. Cyr, the LPR, who had committed a deportable offense before IIRIRA was enacted, was eligible for discretionary relief from deportation. A provision of IIRIRA which removed that eligibility could not be applied retroactively to a pre-IIRIRA guilty plea because it would attach a new disability to the guilty plea.
The court held that:
  • St. Cyr is illustrative.
  • In Vartelas, the law is at least as clear as St. Cyr for declining to apply the law retroactively.
As a result of this analysis, the court concluded that IIRIRA does not govern the impact of any travel abroad by Vartelas. Rather, the law in effect at his conviction, that is Rosenberg v. Fleuti, continues to govern Vartelas' short-term travel.

Practical Implications

The Fleuti doctrine applies to the travel of LPRs who were convicted, before IIRIRA was enacted, of offenses that may be found in the grounds of exclusion but not the grounds of deportation. Brief, casual and innocent trips by these LPRs are governed by the law in force at their conviction. These LPRs may reenter the US without:
  • Requesting admission.
  • Risking their LPR status.
For resources on legal immigration, see PLC Cross-border and Immigration.