Dismissal Affirmed Where United States Could Not Be Joined: Eighth Circuit | Practical Law

Dismissal Affirmed Where United States Could Not Be Joined: Eighth Circuit | Practical Law

In Shields v. Wilkinson, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a case in which the United States was a required party but could not be joined due to sovereign immunity.

Dismissal Affirmed Where United States Could Not Be Joined: Eighth Circuit

Practical Law Legal Update w-000-4043 (Approx. 3 pages)

Dismissal Affirmed Where United States Could Not Be Joined: Eighth Circuit

by Practical Law Litigation
Published on 16 Jun 2015USA (National/Federal)
In Shields v. Wilkinson, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a case in which the United States was a required party but could not be joined due to sovereign immunity.
On June 12, 2015, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Shields v. Wilkinson, affirmed the dismissal of a case in which the United States was a required party but could not be joined due to sovereign immunity (No 13-3773, (8th Cir. June 12, 2015)).
The appellants, Ramona Two Shields and Mary Louise Defender Wilson, were Native Americans who had interests in land allotted to them by the United States under the Dawes Act of 1887. The allotted land was held in trust by the United States but could be leased. The appellants subsequently leased oil and gas mining rights on their land to appellee-companies who won a sealed bid auction conducted by the Board of Indian Affairs (BIA), a government authority required to approve leases only in the best interest of the land owner.
In a putative class action filed in the US District Court for the District of North Dakota, the plaintiffs-appellants alleged that the United States (through the BIA) breached its fiduciary duty to maximize the value obtained by the appellants by failing to negotiate any of the leases and failing to deny any lease presented by the appellee-companies. The plaintiffs-appellants also claimed that the defendant bidders aided, abetted and induced the United States to breach its fiduciary duty. The class action sought to recover from the defendants' profits.
The defendants then filed a FRCP 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss for failure to join the United States as a required party under FRCP 19. The United States filed an amicus brief, arguing that it was a required party that could not be joined and the case should therefore be dismissed. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the United States had an interest in the litigation and that the case could not move forward without it as a party. The appellants appealed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, finding that:
  • The United States was a required party which should be joined if feasible under FRCP 19 because it had interests related to the subject of the action, including the defense of the leasing decisions by the BIA.
  • The United States had more significant interests than a routine joint tortfeasor and therefore could not be a permissive party under joint-and-several liability principles. Categorically barring consideration of these interests beyond those of joint and several liability would be improper.
In order to prevail on their claims, the appellants would have to prove that the United States acted illegally and breached its fiduciary duties in ensuring that the leases signed were in the best interests of the plaintiffs. The court held that because the United States had an interest in the determination of whether it breached its fiduciary duty, its ability to protect its interest would be impaired by its absence. The result would affect the federal interests in administering the leases and overseeing the grant of new leases. The court therefore concluded that the United States was a required party.
Because the United States did not waive sovereign immunity, it could not be joined in the action. The court reviewed the district court's FRCP 19(b) decision and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ultimately dismissing the case for failure to join an indispensable party. The court also noted that the appellants had an adequate alternate remedy because they also filed a separate complaint in the US Court of Federal Claims, which granted summary judgment to the United States, during this time.