Time extension for section 68 challenge refused where challenge doomed to fail | Practical Law

Time extension for section 68 challenge refused where challenge doomed to fail | Practical Law

In Nestor Maritime SA v Sea Anchor Shipping Co Ltd [2012] EWHC 996 (Comm), Eder J considered an application for an extension of time to challenge an award under section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996.

Time extension for section 68 challenge refused where challenge doomed to fail

Practical Law UK Legal Update Case Report 0-519-0981 (Approx. 3 pages)

Time extension for section 68 challenge refused where challenge doomed to fail

by PLC Arbitration
Published on 24 Apr 2012England, Wales
In Nestor Maritime SA v Sea Anchor Shipping Co Ltd [2012] EWHC 996 (Comm), Eder J considered an application for an extension of time to challenge an award under section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996.
The claimant sought to challenge an award under section 68(2)(g) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA96) on the basis that it had been obtained by fraud. The tribunal had ruled that the claimant sellers had fraudulently procured a report which misstated the condition of a vessel for the purposes of a ship sale contract. The claimant now argued that the respondent buyers had known all along that the report was fabricated and had fraudulently relied upon it in the arbitration.
Eder J refused to extend time for the challenge, which had been made more than six months out of time, under section 80(5) of the AA96. He decided that the challenge was doomed to fail by reason of section 73 of the AA96, which prevented a party from raising an objection where he had continued to take part in an arbitration, unless he could show that he did not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered, the grounds for the objection. On the facts, Eder J found that there were grounds to suspect that the report was fabricated. The claimant therefore failed to satisfy the requirements of section 73, with the result that the section 68 application was doomed to fail. Further, the court would, in any event, refuse to extend time as a matter of discretion, having regard to the delay in bringing the application and the fact that the section 68 application was "extremely weak".
Although the facts were unusual, the case is a good example of the practical significance of section 73 and a reminder that applications to extend time must be made quickly. The judgment is also an unusual example of the court relying on the weakness of the underlying claim as justifying the refusal to extend time. (For further information about section 73, see Practice note, Loss of the right to object: section 73 of the English Arbitration Act.)