"Pay to play" practices by investment advisers: SEC proposes stiff penalty and outright bans on certain political activities | Practical Law

"Pay to play" practices by investment advisers: SEC proposes stiff penalty and outright bans on certain political activities | Practical Law

This article is part of the PLC Global Finance August e-mail update for the United States.

"Pay to play" practices by investment advisers: SEC proposes stiff penalty and outright bans on certain political activities

by Nathan J. Greene and John D. Reiss, Shearman & Sterling LLP
Published on 15 Sep 2009USA (National/Federal)

Speedread

On 3 August 2009, the SEC announced proposed rules under the US Investment Advisers Act of 1940 aimed at eliminating "pay to play" practices among investment advisers that manage assets or seek to manage assets for state and local government bodies. This article explains the key elements of the proposals and the issues surrounding them.
On 3 August 2009, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced proposed rules under the US Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Investment Advisers Act) aimed at eliminating "pay to play" practices among investment advisers that manage assets or seek to manage assets for state and local government bodies (such as public pension plans) (see Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2910 (Aug. 3, 2009) (while focusing primarily on public pension plans in its discussion, the SEC acknowledges that the proposed rules, if adopted, would apply broadly to adviser relationships with all types of potential "government clients", including transportation and education programmes, college savings plans (for example, 529 plans) and retirement plans (for example, 403(b) and 457 plans)).
Pay to play practices, as described by the SEC, generally involve advisers making or arranging, or being solicited to make, political contributions while at the same time the adviser is seeking investment advisory business from a government body; often, the contributions are made not with the expectation of actually swaying the selection process one way or another, but simply with the understanding that only contributors will be seriously considered for the business (hence, "pay to play"). According to the SEC, these practices both violate the fiduciary duties of investment advisers and distort the adviser selection process by steering business to advisers that are not necessarily the most qualified or reasonably priced.
The proposed rules contain three main elements:
  • Political contributions. If an investment adviser or its executive officers or certain employees contribute to certain elected officials or candidates for public office, that investment adviser would be prohibited from providing advisory services to government clients affiliated with those officials or candidates for two years after the contribution. The resulting two-year ban (the SEC prefers to call it a "time out") is sufficiently punitive that it will operate, at least at some advisory firms, as an effective prohibition on most state and local political contributions.
  • Placement agents, solicitors, finders, and so on. Investment advisers would be prohibited from paying or agreeing to pay, directly or indirectly, any unaffiliated third party (such as a placement agent) for the purpose of soliciting advisory business from a government entity on the adviser's behalf.
  • Soliciting or arranging political contributions. Investment advisers would be prohibited from soliciting or arranging contributions or payments to certain elected officials, candidates for public office, or political parties of a state or locality where the adviser provides or is seeking to provide advisory services.
The proposed rules would apply to investment advisers who are:
  • Registered under the Investment Advisers Act.
  • Required to be registered under the Act.
  • Unregistered in reliance on the Act's "fifteen client" exemption (Section 203(b)(3)).
    Advisers registered solely with the states will not be subject to the rules.
Advisers otherwise excepted from SEC registration, such as banks, also will not be subject to the rules.
The following points should be noted:
  • Investments in advised funds are considered as providing investment services. The proposed rules consider soliciting an investment in a fund advised by an investment adviser to be substantially equivalent to soliciting the direct management of those assets. (The rules would apply to investments in any vehicle that is an investment company under section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act or excluded from the definition of an investment company by sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7). This captures registered investment companies, hedge funds, private equity funds, bank collective trusts and the like, but appears to exclude – at least as written now – CDOs and other structured vehicles relying on Investment Company Act Rule 3a-7 as well as real estate funds relying on the section 3(c)(5)(C) exception. The SEC has asked for comment on which funds should or should not be included.)
    Therfore, the rules on soliciting would apply equally to fund investors as to separate account clients. The same is true of the two-year ban on receipt of advisory compensation, meaning that an adviser that becomes subject to the ban will have to consider how to unwind fund investments if those investments are made by a jurisdiction to which the adviser's ban applies. (The SEC acknowledges the special issues presented for funds invested in illiquid assets and especially for private equity funds, but offers no ready solution.)
  • "Work-arounds" will be closely scrutinised. Because the proposed rules prohibit actions taken indirectly that would, if done directly, violate any of the prohibitions listed above, the SEC has reserved wide latitude to invoke these rules against advisers that attempt to creatively circumvent the rules (for example, directing contributions through family members). Lest one miss the point, references to concerns about indirect violations appear at fully 50 different places in the SEC's discussion.
  • SEC rules are just the beginning. Individual states or local jurisdictions or even individual public pension plan codes of conduct often establish their own requirements in this area. SEC rules therefore might be thought of as a federal "floor," so that advisers that service or plan to service state or local government bodies must attend to not just the SEC rules (in whatever form they ultimately are adopted), but also to a panoply of local regulation. Comments on the proposed rules are due with the SEC by 6 October 2009.

Familiar territory?

Coming on the heels of a spate of state and SEC suits alleging investment adviser pay to play violations, and with the agency having proposed (but never finalised) similar rules in 1999 (see Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1812 (4 August 1999)) neither the fact of the new SEC proposals nor their general contours come as a surprise. The proposed rules follow closely the 1999 proposal. They proposed rules also are explicitly modelled on Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Rules (MSRB rules) G-37 and G-38, parallel regulations applicable to broker-dealers in the municipal securities business.
There are three reasons for that, each of which is acknowledged more or less explicitly in the SEC's rule release:
  • The SEC states repeatedly that it believes the MSRB rules work, that they significantly curtailed the pay to play culture of municipal bond underwriting.
  • The MSRB rules are a known quantity. With many brokerage firms having invested significant sums in developing compliance infrastructure to deal with them, the SEC does not want to foster confusion and inefficiency by upsetting those arrangements with a new set of rules that does not closely align with them.
  • The SEC knows that it risks treading on thin ice in restricting constitutionally protected political activity. Because the restrictions under the MSRB rules were upheld in a 1995 case (Blount v SEC, 61F.3d 938, 945 (1995), cert. denied, 517 US 1119 (1996)) the agency is trying to stay close to the same path so as to minimise the risk of having its new rules overturned. That said, a constitutional challenge is probably inevitable. Such a challenge would argue that:
    • the new rules deserve greater scrutiny, because a two-year ban on an advisory firm's business is a harsher outcome than for an underwriting firm (the advisor-client relationship being continuous, while the underwriting relationship is periodic); and
    • Supreme Court and other influential court cases subsequent to Blount v SEC have been more respectful of political contributions as protected "speech," so that the lay of the land may have shifted.

The two-year ban

Proposed rule 206(4)-5(a)(1) under the Investment Advisers Act would prohibit advisers from providing advisory services "for compensation," to a government entity (broadly defined to include all state and local – but not federal – government and government-sponsored agencies, instrumentalities, plans, programs, pools of assets, and so on) for a period of two years after the adviser or any of its "covered associates" makes a "contribution" to an "official" of the government entity.
The terms in quotation marks have the following meanings:
  • The significance of the prohibition applying only to providing services "for compensation" is that the SEC believes an adviser that becomes subject to a prohibition cannot simply bow out of an ongoing engagement. Instead the fiduciary duty owed the client usually will dictate that the adviser continue to provide uncompensated advisory services for a reasonable period of time until the affected client is able to find a replacement adviser.
  • An "official" includes incumbents, candidates or successful candidates for elective office of a government entity if the office involved:
    • is itself directly or indirectly responsible for or can influence the selection of an investment adviser; or
    • is authorised to appoint a person who is.
    The office's scope of authority, not actual influence exercised, is the determining factor.
    Also, a state official remains subject to the rule even though the state official may be seeking contributions when seeking federal office.
  • "Contribution" generally includes any gift, subscription, loan, advance, deposit of money, or anything of value made for the purpose of any of the following:
    • influencing any election for Federal, state or local office;
    • the payment of debt incurred in connection with any such election; or
    • transition of inaugural expenses of a successful candidate for state or local office.
    A contribution would not include volunteer campaign work by an individual, provided the adviser did not solicit the individual's volunteer work and provided the adviser's resources, such as office space, are not used. Contributions to political parties are not included unless they are used as an indirect means to channel the contribution to an official, as might be the case if the party contribution is to be earmarked for use by or for an official. Contributions to state and local political parties are, however, subject to the rule's proposed record-keeping requirements.
    Notwithstanding the fact that the definition of a contribution includes a for-the-purpose element, the SEC appears to believe that it would not need proof of intent to invoke the rules, saying that "requiring proof of … intent would greatly diminish, if not eliminate, the prophylactic value of the proposed rule." (Another question raised by the definition of a contribution is whether it would capture, for example, speaking fees paid to an official at a conference or other business event organised by an adviser that is not otherwise of the character of a fundraising event.)
  • "Covered associates" include the adviser's general partners, managing members, executive officers, other individuals with similar functions or positions, employees of the adviser who solicit advisory business from government clients, and any political action committee (PAC) of any covered associate. "Executive officer" includes the adviser's president and vice presidents in charge of principal business units, as well as other executive officers that perform or supervise, directly or indirectly, investment advisory services or solicit clients for the adviser. (The SEC release includes an extended discussion of who is and is not intended to be treated as a covered associate under the rules. That discussion leaves open the possibility that having a large, but passive, financial interest in an adviser could make one a covered associate, though how and on what basis the adviser would police contributions by such a person is difficult to see.)
One effect of the proposed rules will be a new degree of caution when hiring personnel who may qualify as "covered associates" - likely resulting in pre-hire questionnaires around the topic of political contributions and political activity. This is because the proposal includes a "look back" provision that subjects the adviser to the two-year ban even if a covered associate of the adviser made the triggering contribution prior to employment with the adviser. Additionally, the two-year ban continues to apply to an adviser if the covered associate who made the contribution while with the adviser then leaves the firm. The two-year ban applies only as to government entities to whose officials contributions have been made. At least under these rules, an adviser would not be restricted, for example, in providing advisory services to a public pension plan in New York after the adviser's president made a contribution to a California official with influence over the selection of advisers for a California pension plan. (This assumes of course that no such contributions were made to New York officials.)

Ban on use of placement agents, pension consultants or other third parties to solicit government business

The proposed rules absolutely prohibit advisers and their covered associates from making or agreeing to make payments to unaffiliated third parties (such as placement agents or pension consultants) to solicit government business. "Solicit" is defined broadly to include any direct or indirect communication for the purpose of obtaining a client for or referring a client to an adviser.
This prohibition would not apply to solicitations by covered associates or personnel of the adviser itself or certain affiliates of the adviser or their employees, such that an adviser could pay a sister company under common control with the adviser to solicit government business.
Some states, including New York, have recently addressed the use by investment advisers of placement agents and other third party solicitors in seeking government advisory business. The New York Attorney General, for example, published a Public Pension Fund Reform Code of Conduct banning the use of placement agents, which was adopted by several advisers as part of out-of-court settlements in pay to play investigations (see, for example, Cuomo Secures Agreement with Leading Pension Fund Advisor Pacific Corporate Group Holdings to Adopt Code of Conduct and Eliminate Pay-to-Play in Pension Funds Nationwide, where the adviser is providing or seeking to provide advisory services.)
Both the proposed SEC rules in this area and the New York Attorney General's code of conduct leave a number of ambiguities, not least that the New York code of conduct prohibits the use of "placement agents" without defining the term. Those ambiguities and the fact that intermediaries serve an important market function for both advisers and their potential clients that is not readily severed suggest that the solicitor ban – although it probably will generate less near-term attention than the political contribution rules – will take longer for the industry to both make sense of and ultimately come to terms with.

Ban on adviser solicitation or co-ordination of political contributions

The proposed rules also prohibit advisers and their covered associates from soliciting or co-ordinating contributions to an official or payments to a political party of a state or locality.
This prohibition would restrict an adviser from, for example, "bundling" de minimis contributions of its covered associates. Like payments to third party solicitors, such adviser solicitation and co-ordination is completely banned under the proposed rules (meaning that more is at stake than a two-year ban).

The record-keeping requirement

The SEC would require registered advisers to invest to maintain certain new records if they:
  • Have or seek government clients.
  • Provide advisory services to fund clients in which a government entity invests or is solicited.
(Unregistered advisers get a pass on this aspect of the proposal, but presumably are expected to keep similar records as a basic compliance practice.)
The new required records would include:
  • Names, titles and addresses of all "covered associates".
  • A list of all government entities for which the adviser (including any covered associates), currently or in the last five years (this would not apply to five year periods before the effective date of the proposed rules) has provided or sought to provide advisory services, or that have been investors or have been solicited to invest in any covered investment pool client of the adviser.
  • A chronological listing and description of all direct and indirect contributions and payments made by the adviser or any of its covered associates to a government official, political action committee, or state or local political party.

Proposed exceptions

There are a number of exceptions:
  • US$250 de minimis exception. The most significant exception is that the ban is not triggered by a contribution made by a natural person for the benefit of an official for whom the contributor can vote and amounting to less than US$250. A separate US$250 limit is available to each natural person (and, in fact, each can give US$250 in a primary election and then another US$250 to the same official in the general election).
  • Twice-each-year exception. The SEC proposes what it calls a "self-executing exception that should prevent many inadvertent violations." The exception is not, however, a generous one. It provides that the ban is not triggered by a contribution made by a covered associate so long as:
    • the contribution was for no more than US$250;
    • the contribution was discovered by the adviser within four months of the date of contribution, putting an obvious premium on a compliance framework capable of catching such an incident within the requisite time period; and
    • the contributor must obtain the return of the contribution within 60 days of discovery by the adviser.
    Moreover, each covered associate gets only one bite at the apple, so that the adviser cannot rely on the exception as to that person – forever – after the first such incident. Finally, this exception can be relied on by an adviser, across its business (and no matter how many covered persons it has), only twice in any 12-month period.
  • Registered investment company exception. Advisers to registered investment companies are subject to the proposed two-year ban rules only when the registered investment company is selected as an investment option for a government investment plan (for example, a 529 plan), but would not be subject to the ban simply because a government entity makes investments in that investment company. Advisers to registered investment companies in all cases, however, would be subject to the proposed rules' other prohibitions regarding payments to unaffiliated third parties and the coordination or solicitation of third parties for certain political payments or contributions.
  • Case-by-case exception. The SEC retains the discretion, on application by an adviser, to conditionally or unconditionally exempt the adviser from any or all of the proposed rule's prohibitions. As written, it appears that the SEC primarily intends to use this discretion in the case of advisers that have become subject to the two-year ban but for which extenuating circumstances warrant an exception.

Potential industry reaction

Discussion of the proposed rules is likely to revive issues and concerns that were raised by the SEC's earlier 1999 rule-making. It therefore is useful to go back to that record and review the comment files generated then. In summarising those comments, the SEC says the following:
  • Public pension plans and beneficiaries generally favoured the proposed rule.
  • State government officials argued against the rule based on the sufficiency of state laws to address the matter.
  • Investment advisers argued against the rules mostly on the basis of their breadth and harsh consequences for violation.
Our own review of the 1999 comment record turns up some interesting themes:
Letters from advisers objected to, among other things, the length of the ban, the "look back" provision in which contributions made by an individual at a prior employer carry over to taint the current employer, and the limited size and scope of the de minimis exception.
The prospect of a hard ban on using third party solicitors drew repeated comment (with an outsize impact on smaller investment advisers especially feared) (for example, Wesley Ogburn, Portfolio Manager, Stanford Management Company (Stanford University Endowment), Menlo Park, California, 4 August 2009 (noting a possible disproportionate effect on smaller investment advisers that often rely on third party solicitors and cannot afford an extensive internal marketing and sales staff)).
One letter, in particular, stands out for the size of the organisation and the compliance approach the firm said it would have to adopt. The firm argued that distinguishing who is and is not a covered person from day to day and which donations do and do not qualify for exceptions was sufficiently complex, and the penalty for a misjudgment (that is, the two-year ban) so harsh, that its response would have been a flat prohibition on every employee from making any political contributions or engaging in volunteer political activity (comment letter from Andrew J. Bowden, Deputy General Counsel and Vice President, Legg Mason, Inc., 1 November 1999).
The Federal Election Commission also weighed in. While the rules generally are not applicable to federal officials, state officials running for federal office would be covered, causing members of the FEC to comment that application of pay to play rules to federal campaigns impermissibly encroaches on the exclusive domain of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (comment letter from Darryl R. Wold, Vice Chairman, Lee Ann Elliott, Commissioner and David M. Mason Commissioner, Federal Election Commission, 1 November 1999).
Again, the public comment period ends 6 October 2009. Meanwhile Shearman & Sterling will continue to monitor and report on the rule proposal. For further information, click here.