Enter to open, tab to navigate, enter to select
Paid Suspension Is Not an Adverse Employment Action For Substantive Title VII Discrimination Claims: Third Circuit
Practical Law Legal Update 7-618-1326 (Approx. 4 pages)
Paid Suspension Is Not an Adverse Employment Action For Substantive Title VII Discrimination Claims: Third Circuit
by Practical Law Labor & Employment
| Published on 18 Aug 2015 • USA (National/Federal) |
In Jones v. SEPTA, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that an employee's paid suspension pending an investigation of alleged workplace wrongdoing is not an adverse employment action for purposes of a substantive Title VII claim.
On August 12, 2015, in Jones v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, that a paid suspension pending an investigation of an employee's alleged workplace wrongdoing, without more, is not an adverse employment action for purposes of a substantive Title VII claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to a public transit employer, finding that a paid suspension did not fall within the list of adverse actions in Title VII's substantive provision and that it did not tangibly alter an employee's employment terms and conditions. (No. 14-3814, (3d Cir. Aug. 12, 2015).)
Background
Michelle Jones worked as an administrative assistant for the Southeastern Pennyslvania Transit Authority (SEPTA). In December 2010, Jones was suspended with full pay after her supervisor, Alfred Outlaw, discovered that she had apparently submitted fraudulent timesheets. Jones then told SEPTA's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Office that Outlaw had sexually harassed and retaliated against her. SEPTA's inspector general's office investigated the timesheet issue and found that Jones had submitted fraudulent timesheets. In February 2011, Jones was suspended without pay. In April 2011, SEPTA terminated Jones's employment.
Jones sued SEPTA and Outlaw in US district court alleging, among other claims, gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and Pennsylvania law. The district court granted summary judgment to SEPTA on all claims. Jones appealed to the Third Circuit.
Outcome
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to SEPTA on Jones's Title VII claims, holding, as a matter of first impression in the circuit, that a paid suspension pending determination of a workplace misconduct investigation, without more, does not constitute an adverse action in a substantive Title VII discrimination claim.
The Third Circuit noted that:
- Title VII forbids discrimination in:
- failing or refusing to hire or discharging an individual; and
- compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
- To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee must prove that she suffered an adverse employment action (Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003)).
- An adverse employment action is typically something that is serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment (Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004)).
- Other circuit courts of appeals have unanimously held that an employer placing an employee on paid administrative leave pending an investigation is not an adverse employment action under Title VII's substantive provision (Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2006); Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 891–92 (8th Cir. 2005); Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 988 (6th Cir. 2004).).
The Third Circuit held that a paid suspension does not:
- Fall within the list of adverse actions in Title VII's substantive provision.
- Represent a serious, tangible change in an employee's employment terms or conditions because employees are always subject to appropriate application of an employer's disciplinary policies.
The court did not decide whether a paid suspension is an adverse employment action in the retaliation context because Jones presented no evidence showing that any informal complaints she made about Outlaw caused him to suspend her with pay. The Third Circuit also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to SEPTA on Jones's Title VII gender discrimination claim based on her suspension without pay and termination, holding that Jones failed to produce sufficient evidence that these adverse actions were linked to discrimination or any alleged misconduct by SEPTA or Outlaw.
Practical Implications
The Third Circuit's decision in Jones v. SEPTA is a victory for employers defending discrimination claims that are entirely or at least partially premised on a paid suspension. The decision reinforces that paid suspensions can be an effective tool for removing a problem employee from the workplace while an employer investigates alleged workplace misconduct and decides on a further course of action.
Employers that impose paid suspensions on employees as a disciplinary tool should ensure that the paid suspension is:
- Necessary to investigate a serious issue of alleged workplace misconduct by the suspended employee.
- Brief in duration.
- Ends when the investigation is completed and a determination is made about whether to:
- return the employee to work; and
- impose any further discipline, including an unpaid suspension or termination.