Reasonable Response to Employee's Complaints of Harassment Shields Employer from Title VII Liability: Seventh Circuit | Practical Law

Reasonable Response to Employee's Complaints of Harassment Shields Employer from Title VII Liability: Seventh Circuit | Practical Law

In Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer, holding that where the employer promptly and reasonably responded to an employee's complaints of sexual and racial harassment, and effectively stopped the harassment, the employer was not liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). The court also held that because sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII, an employee cannot maintain a retaliation claim based on a complaint of statements regarding sexual orientation.

Reasonable Response to Employee's Complaints of Harassment Shields Employer from Title VII Liability: Seventh Circuit

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 15 Sep 2014 • USA (National/Federal)
In Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer, holding that where the employer promptly and reasonably responded to an employee's complaints of sexual and racial harassment, and effectively stopped the harassment, the employer was not liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). The court also held that because sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII, an employee cannot maintain a retaliation claim based on a complaint of statements regarding sexual orientation.
On September 9, 2014, in Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that where the employer promptly and reasonably responded to an employee's complaints of sexual and racial harassment, and effectively stopped the harassment, the employer was not liable under Title VII. The court also held that because sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII, an employee cannot maintain a retaliation claim based on a complaint of statements regarding sexual orientation. (12-1723, (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2014).)

Background

In 2006, Warnether Muhammad was employed by Caterpillar, Inc. (Caterpillar). Between August and October 2006, Muhammad's coworkers made offensive oral and written comments about Muhammad's race and perceived sexual orientation as follows:
  • A coworker called Muhammad a "black nigger." Muhammad complained to human resources. After the complaint, that employee made no further racial comments to Muhammad.
  • A coworker stated that he did not like Muhammad's "black faggot ass." Muhammad reported the statement to his supervisor, Kipp Edwards, who told human resources. Muhammad had no subsequent problems with that employee.
  • A coworker told Muhammad that her grandchildren are black, that she does not like them or black people generally, and that she wished her daughter had dated a white man. His supervisor, Kipp Edwards, again complained to human resources. The next month, the same employee commented to Muhammad that "his black butt should have stayed fired." Muhammad did not report this additional incident to Caterpillar.
  • Employees wrote graffiti that Muhammad "is a fag, a know it all fag," that he "sucks Kippy dick" (referring to Kipp Edwards), that he has AIDS, and that he is a "black nigger" who "should be killed." Muhammad reported the graffiti to Edwards who contacted the shift supervisor and the labor relations representative. Edwards immediately had the graffiti painted over. Similar graffiti reappeared a few days later which Edwards again immediately had painted over.
  • More graffiti appeared at the end of August, and once again Edwards had the graffiti removed. Each person on Muhammad's line was individually warned that defacing the walls would result in immediate termination. No more graffiti appeared.
In October, Muhammad was indefinitely suspended for insubordination due to his reaction to his supervisor's discipline for his use of work time (during a bathroom break) to check the bid board.
Following an investigation of the alleged misconduct, Caterpillar deemed Muhammad's suspension appropriate. Muhammad then:
  • Filed a grievance through his union representative and was allowed to return to work in November 2006.
  • Was suspended, then terminated a second time due to interactions with his coworkers.
  • Returned to work at Caterpillar with no back pay in July 2008, after his grievance settled.
  • Was laid off due to a reduction in force in April 2009.
  • Was later rehired and remains employed by Caterpillar.
Muhammad filed charges of harassment and retaliation with the EEOC and in June 2009 received his right-to-sue letter. Soon afterwards, Muhammad filed this suit, alleging that:
  • He was harassed with offensive comments about his perceived sexual orientation and his race.
  • Edwards suspended him in retaliation for reporting the offensive graffiti to the shift supervisor.
The district court:
  • Granted summary judgment for Caterpillar.
  • Rejected the claim of sexual harassment, relying on Spearman v. Ford Motor Company, which held that the Title VII prohibition on discrimination based on sex extended only to discrimination based on a person's gender, and not comments aimed at a person's sexual orientation (231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000)).
  • Ruled that Caterpillar was not liable for any racial harassment by coworkers because Caterpillar's responses to Muhammad's harassment complaints were reasonable and effective in stopping the harassment.
  • Concluded that Muhammad lacked evidence that Edwards retaliated against him for complaining about the harassment.
Muhammad appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that:
  • His coworkers' derogatory comments about sexual orientation were based on his sex.
  • His coworkers would not have directed their comments towards a female in the workplace notwithstanding her sexual preferences (an argument raised for the first time on appeal).
  • "[I]t is ... conceivable to believe that he was harassed because he was a male who did not, in the mind [sic] of his harassers, act like a male."

Outcome

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that:
  • Muhammad did not present evidence supporting his hostile work environment claim based on sexual harassment.
  • Caterpillar reasonably responded to Muhammad's complaints of sexual and racial harassment, and therefore was not liable under Title VII.
  • Statements regarding sexual orientation are not prohibited conduct under Title VII. Muhammad cannot maintain a retaliation claim based on a complaint of conduct that is not covered under Title VII. Summary judgment was proper on that basis alone.
  • Muhammad did not provide evidence that Caterpillar retaliated against him for complaining about racial harassment.
The Seventh Circuit found that:
  • Muhammad's argument that his coworkers would not have harassed a female for her sexual preferences is speculation, and he does not produce evidence to support this assertion.
  • Caterpillar's reasonable and effective responses to Muhammad's complaints of sexual and racial harassment bar his legal claims.
  • After Caterpillar responded to Muhammad's reports of offensive comments by his coworkers, only one of the coworkers made a repeat comment, which Muhammad never reported. An employer is not liable for sexual harassment by coworkers if a mechanism to report the harassment exists but the victim does not use it (Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 612-13 (7th Cir.2003); Montgomery v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 392 (7th Cir.2010)).
  • Each time Muhammad reported graffiti, Caterpillar responded quickly and soon stopped the problem permanently. Muhammad concedes that the graffiti did not reappear after the warning was given.
  • Muhammad's argument that Caterpillar should have done more to identify who was responsible for the graffiti and to punish the coworkers who harassed him fails. Title VII only requires employers to take action reasonably calculated to stop unlawful harassment, not necessarily to discipline or punish the employees responsible (Porter v. Erie Foods Int'l, 576 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir.2009); Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 984-85 (7th Cir.2008)).
  • Muhammad's sexual harassment complaint relies solely on statements regarding his sexual orientation, which is not prohibited conduct under Title VII. Therefore, Muhammad cannot maintain a retaliation claim based on a complaint of conduct that is not covered under Title VII, and summary judgment was proper on that basis alone. (Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Center, Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707-08 (7th Cir.2000); Magyar v. Saint Joseph Regional Medical Center, 544 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir.2008)).
  • The circumstantial evidence presented in the case is insufficient to allow the court to conclude that Caterpillar retaliated against Muhammad because of his complaint of harassment.
  • It is undisputed that Edwards approached Muhammad with a concern about his performance and that a conflict arose. Due to that conflict, Edwards decided to suspend Muhammad. This evidence is consistent with Caterpillar's argument that the suspension was not retaliatory, but was based on Muhammad's insubordinate conduct in the course of that discussion.
  • Muhammad submitted minimal evidence in support of his retaliation claim. He only testified that at the August shift meeting, after he complained about the graffiti, Edwards mentioned to him that he should follow the proper chain of command in submitting complaints. There is virtually no evidence, other than the possible temporal proximity, that this conversation played a role in his later suspension. Mere temporal proximity is rarely sufficient (Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir.2014); Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.2006)). More evidence is needed to survive summary judgment.
  • Muhammad's argument that his checking the bid board could not have been the actual reason for his suspension because others who engaged in similar conduct were not disciplined, fails because it ignores that he was suspended due to his insubordinate reaction to his supervisor when he was disciplined about the bid board incident, not due to his conduct in actually checking the bid board.
  • Muhammad has provided only conjecture as to the reason for his suspension, which is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim.

Practical Implications

Employers should be encouraged by the finding that a prompt and reasonable response to employee complaints of sexual and racial harassment that are effective in stopping the harassment will likely shield the employer from liability under Title VII. In addition, this decision once again highlights the importance of implementing policies with a clear and effective mechanism for reporting complaints of harassment and discrimination. The court did not hold the employer liable based on the sole incident of alleged harassment by a coworker that Muhammad failed to report. Finally, although this decision makes it clear that statements based on sexual orientation cannot support a harassment or discrimination claim under Title VII, many state and local laws treat sexual orientation as a protected class (see Anti-discrimination Laws: State Q&A Tool).