Second Circuit Interprets "Legal Representative" Under Lanham Act for Section 32 Standing | Practical Law

Second Circuit Interprets "Legal Representative" Under Lanham Act for Section 32 Standing | Practical Law

In a case of first impression in the federal courts of appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled on the meaning of "legal representative" for purposes of standing to bring a claim for infringement of a registered trademark under Section 32 of the Lanham Act.

Second Circuit Interprets "Legal Representative" Under Lanham Act for Section 32 Standing

by Practical Law Intellectual Property & Technology
Published on 06 Aug 2013USA (National/Federal)
In a case of first impression in the federal courts of appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled on the meaning of "legal representative" for purposes of standing to bring a claim for infringement of a registered trademark under Section 32 of the Lanham Act.
On August 5, 2013, in Federal Treasury Enterprise v. SPI Spirits Ltd., the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled on the meaning of "legal representative" for purposes of standing to bring a claim for infringement of a registered trademark under Section 32 of the Lanham Act, an issue of first impression in the federal courts of appeal. The Second Circuit affirmed the US District Court for the Southern District of New York's determination that a party qualifies as a legal representative under the Lanham Act if both:
  • The party has legal authority to represent the owner.
  • The registrant is unable or incapable of representing itself and enforcing its own rights.
Federal Treasury Enterprise Sojuzplodoimport (FTE), a state-chartered entity of the Russian Federation, and its licensee sued various defendants for infringement of certain registered trademarks related to the Russian vodka known as "Stolichnaya." FTE did not dispute that the Russian Federation owned the marks. Because Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act expressly restricts standing to the registrant (owner), or its legal representatives, predecessors and assigns, FTE argued that it was either the Russian Federation's assign or legal representative. The SDNY ultimately dismissed the suit, finding that FTE lacked standing.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting FTE's argument for a broader definition of the term legal representative that would have included any party that exercises another person's rights over a trademark on that person's behalf. It concluded that interpreting this phrase broadly would allow both the registrant and its putative legal representative to file separate suits against the same defendant for the same infringing act, a result inconsistent with Congress's stated intention to limit standing to the single registrant of the trademark under Section 32 as opposed to the broad standing given plaintiffs suing under Section 43 of the Act. The court also noted that the broader interpretation would potentially conflict with constitutional standing requirements under Article III.
Court document: