Ms Nikolova, a Bulgarian national, lived in a district where the electricity provider installed meters at a height of between six and seven metres, whereas in other districts the meters were much lower. Ms Nikolova complained that she was not able to reach the meters to read them and assess her consumption, and that her bills were excessive. The electricity provider stated that the reason for the height was frequent tampering and unlawful activity connected to the meters in Ms Nikolova's district. The district was inhabited by persons predominantly of Roma origin, although Ms Nikolova was not of Roma origin.

The electricity provider challenged Ms Nikolova's successful complaint. The Bulgarian court referred several questions to the ECJ.

The ECJ held that Ms Nikolova could bring a claim of indirect discrimination, even though she was not of Roma origin, because together with those in her district of Roma origin, she suffered the same disadvantageous effect of the unusually high electricity meters.

Although this case concerned the law of equal treatment in the provision of goods and services, the principles will have clear application to legislation concerning equality in employment.

Section 19 requires that a claimant must possess the relevant protected characteristic to advance a claim of indirect discrimination. However, in light of CHEZ, this now appears incompatible with EU law. Pending an amendment of section 19 by Parliament, it is likely that the employment tribunals will read in or delete parts of section 19, in so far as necessary to give effect to CHEZ.

As a result, employers and businesses could be affected in the near future. Of principal concern is the fact that the group of individuals who could potentially bring claims of indirect discrimination has been significantly expanded (see box "Indirect discrimination").

For example, if a male employee's request to work reduced hours because of childcare needs is refused, a claim for indirect discrimination might now result. The male employee could allege that the refusal is a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) which puts women at a particular disadvantage compared to others, as women are more likely to have childcare responsibilities than men. As the male employee could be said to be suffering together with those women, he may now be able to claim indirect sex discrimination, despite being a man.

It will be interesting to see how far the judiciary will allow this concept to go. If the principle were to be adhered to strictly, it could produce some bizarre results. Indeed, it is conceivable that it could lead to consequences that the law of equal treatment was never intended to address, or that run counter to its stated aims.

How close the suffering of the potential claimant must be to those who do possess the protected characteristic is a particularly interesting issue. Take the scenario of an employer who has a uniform policy which forbids employees from wearing their hair in cornrows. It has been previously held, in the context of a school uniform policy, that this can constitute a PCP that disadvantages those of an African-Caribbean ethnicity (G v Head Teacher and Governing Body of St Gregory's Catholic Science College [2011] EWHC 1452).

Following CHEZ, it now seems perfectly feasible that a white-British employee who wears her hair in cornrows for fashion reasons could bring an indirect discrimination claim as she suffers together with those of an African-Caribbean ethnicity. This is despite the fact that the suffering of the white-British claimant could be said to be considerably less significant than that of African-Caribbean employees, who may seek to wear their hair in cornrows for cultural reasons.

A recent Court of Appeal decision demonstrates a possible approach that the UK judiciary could take in reconciling this issue (Home Office (UK Border Agency) v Essop and others [2015] EWCA Civ 609; www.practicallaw.com/8-617-5080). Essop established that, in order to succeed in a claim of indirect discrimination, a claimant must prove that he actually suffered from the same disadvantage as those in the protected group.

This is consistent with CHEZ as Ms Nikolova did, in fact, suffer from precisely the same disadvantage as the Roma inhabitants in her district. But in the cornrows hairstyle example, the white-British claimant might be required to demonstrate that her suffering was not simply the thwarting of her desire to wear a particular hairstyle, but rather an inability to express her cultural beliefs.

Disability discrimination is another area of potential controversy. Indirect disability discrimination tends to be more difficult to establish than claims stemming from a failure to make reasonable adjustments or discrimination arising from a disability. Prospective claimants also face the challenge of establishing that they are disabled under the 2010 Act definition. Now that the requirement of possessing the protected characteristic appears to have been removed in certain instances, there may be a rise in the number of indirect disability discrimination claims.

While it is possible to objectively justify indirect discrimination, the ECJ in CHEZ was at pains to stress that this concept is to be interpreted strictly. As a result, there is only limited hope that domestic courts will be more lenient in this respect despite the significant expansion of discrimination rights.

While the ECJ's aim of eradicating discrimination in absolute terms is certainly laudable, it begs the question of whether discrimination legislation was really supposed to go this far? It seems that the objective of providing a level playing field has been left behind. Now, those without a protected characteristic are being afforded the helping hand that was surely intended to be reserved for those people who possess the protected characteristic, or are very closely associated with it, and therefore most need it.

Meanwhile, employers can surely expect to see a rise in claims based on indirect discrimination from employees who are unsure of (in disability cases), or do not even possess, a protected characteristic.